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PRIVACY LAW’S FALSE PROMISE 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Privacy laws have never seemed stronger. New international, national, 
state, and local laws have been passed with the promise of greater 
protection for consumers. Courts across the globe are reclaiming the law’s 
power to limit collection of our data. And yet, our privacy seems more in 
danger now than ever, with frequent admissions of nefarious data use 
practices from social media, mobile apps, and e-commerce websites, among 
others. Why are privacy laws, seemingly more comprehensive than ever, not 
working to protect our privacy? This Article explains. 
Based on original primary source research—interviews with engineers, 
privacy professionals, and vendor executives; product demonstrations; 
webinars, blogs, industry literature; and more—this Article argues that 
privacy law is failing to deliver its promised protections because it is 
undergoing a process of legal endogeneity: mere symbols of compliance are 
standing in for real privacy protections. Toothless trainings, audits, and 
paper trails, among other symbols, are being confused for actual adherence 
to privacy law, which has the effect of undermining the promise of greater 
privacy protection for consumers. 
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The people we trust with our data are putting our privacy at risk. 
Facebook has long been cavalier about protecting personal information 
from third parties.1 Mobile app platforms routinely sweep in user data 
merely because they can.2 Manufacturers of toasters,3 toothbrushes,4 and 
sex toys5 are wiring up everything to the Internet of Things, tracking 
 
1. See Josh Constine & Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Admits Cambridge Analytica Hijacked 
Data on Up to 87M Users, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/c 
ambridge-analytica-87-million/ [https://perma.cc/L54K-3X7U]. 
2. See Robert McMillan, The Hidden Privacy Threat of … Flashlight Apps?, WIRED (Oct. 20, 
2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps/ [https://perma.cc/28K9-7J9Z]. 
3. See Die-Cast 2-Slice Smart Toaster, BREVILLE, https://www.breville.com/us/en/products/toa 
sters/bta820.html [https://perma.cc/4AK6-GWTP]. 
4. See Why Switch to a Bluetooth Electric Toothbrush?, ORAL-B, https://oralb.com/en-us/pro 
ducts/compare/bluetooth [https://perma.cc/Z3V6-E9ZY]. 
5. See Cory Doctorow, The Internet of Connected Sex Toys Is Every Bit as Horrifyingly Insecure 












intimate behaviors while giving hackers countless opportunities for 
mischief.6 Facial recognition technology proliferates despite its Orwellian 
dangers.7 Even academic researchers are mining intimate data without our 
consent.8 Our privacy is in danger. And the laws that are supposed to protect 
us do not seem to be working. This Article explains why. 
Privacy law—a combination of statutes, constitutional norms, regulatory 
orders, and court decisions—has never seemed stronger. The European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)9 has been called 
“comprehensive”10 and “one of the strictest privacy laws in the world.”11 
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)12 stakes out similar ground.13 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) broad regulatory arsenal is 
putting limits on the collection, use, and manipulation of personal 
information.14 The U.S. Supreme Court has started to reclaim the Fourth 
Amendment’s historical commitment to curtailing pervasive police 
 
2018/02/02/sarah-jamie-lewis.html [https://perma.cc/W2ZJ-TTHW]; see also THE INTERNET OF DONGS 
PROJECT, https://internetofdon.gs/ [https://perma.cc/F5EN-PSRW]. 
6. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014). 
7. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for 
Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-
for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/X55V-FAG5]. 
8. See Woodrow Hartzog, There Is No Such Thing as “Public” Data, SLATE (May 19, 2016, 
9:15 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/05/okcupid_s_data_leak_show 
s_there_s_no_such_thing_as_public_data.html [https://perma.cc/47PT-8Z9A]; Taylor Hatmaker, In 
2006, Harvard Also Conducted a Facebook Study that Went Too Far, DAILY DOT (July 12, 2014, 10:55 
AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/facebook-t3-study-tastes-ties-time/ [https://perma.cc/SV6K-SB 
TW]. 
9. See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, May 4, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter 
GDPR]. 
10. William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 963 (2016). 
11. Daniel Solove, Beyond GDPR: The Challenge of Global Privacy Compliance—An Interview 
with Lothar Determann, TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2017), https://teachprivacy.com/challenge-of-global 
-privacy-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/4956-Q6TK]. 
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2018). 
13. See Lydia de la Torre, GDPR Matchup: The California Consumer Privacy Act 2018, IAPP 
PRIVACY TRACKER (July 31, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-california-consumer-privacy 
-act/ [https://perma.cc/53CF-B3JJ] (comparing the GDPR and the CCPA and showing how the latter is 
broader than the former in certain respects). Almost every media outlet reporting on the CCPA has called 
it the “toughest” or “strictest” privacy law in the United States. See, e.g., April Glaser, California Just 
Passed the Strictest Online Privacy Bill in the Country, SLATE (June 28, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://slate.co 
m/technology/2018/06/california-just-passed-the-strictest-online-privacy-bill-in-the-country.html [http 
s://perma.cc/LC54-B98V]. 
14. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
145–192 (2016) (describing the origins and multiple ways the FTC protects the privacy of U.S. 
consumers); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 627–48 (2014) (arguing that the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence should be 
understood as an emerging common law that grows and adapts with new technologies and challenges). 











surveillance by requiring warrants for cell-site location data.15 And the E.U. 
Court of Justice has challenged the cross-border transfer of European 
citizens’ data, signaling that American companies need to do far more to 
protect personal information.16  
This seems remarkably comprehensive. But the law’s veneer of 
protection is hiding the fact that it is built on a house of cards. Privacy law 
is failing to deliver its promised protections in part because the corporate 
practice of privacy reconceptualizes adherence to privacy law as a 
compliance, rather than a substantive, task. Corporate privacy practices 
today are, to use Julie Cohen’s term, managerial.17 They prioritize 
innovation over regulation, efficiency over social welfare, and paperwork 
over substance. They also rely on new technologies to automate legal 
decisions. This Article provides the first picture of this growing privacy 
compliance market. Based on original primary source research into the 
ecosystem of privacy compliance, I argue that privacy law is experiencing 
a process of legal endogeneity: mere symbols of compliance are standing in 
for real privacy protections.  
This development is new for privacy, but not new for the law. Legal 
endogeneity, as theorized by the socio-legal scholar Lauren Edelman,18 
describes how the law, rather than constraining or guiding the behavior of 
regulated entities, is actually shaped by ideas emerging from the space the 
law seeks to regulate.19 It occurs when compliance professionals on the 
ground have significant power to define what the law means in practice. 
When given that opportunity, compliance professionals often frame the law 
in accordance with managerial values like operational efficiency and 
reducing corporate risk rather than the substantive goals the law is meant to 
achieve, like consumer protection or equality. This opens the door for 
companies to create structures, policies, and protocols that comply with the 
 
15. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (requiring the government to obtain a 
warrant before acquiring cell-site location data); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) 
(declaring warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone unconstitutional); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[L]onger term GPS monitoring . . . impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”). 
16. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650 (declaring the Safe 
Harbor arrangement, which allowed the transfer of data to the United States, unconstitutional because it 
did not adequately protect the privacy of EU citizens). 
17. See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 7, 143 (2019); see also id. at 143–47 (arguing that managerialization of 
law is a product of the neoliberal project focused on governmental efficiency, nonintervention, and 
innovation at all costs). 
18. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2016) (developing the theory of legal endogeneity in the context of Title VII and workplace 
sex discrimination law). 












law in name only.20 As these symbolic structures become more common, 
judges and policymakers defer to them as paradigms of best practices or as 
evidence for an affirmative defense or safe harbor, mistaking mere symbols 
of compliance with adherence to legal mandates.21 When this happens, law 
fails to achieve substantive goals because the compliance metric—the 
adoption of symbols, processes, procedures, and policies within a corporate 
environment—may be orthogonal to actual progress. Edelman discussed 
legal endogeneity in the context of race and sex discrimination in the 
workplace, where the equality goals of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
were being frustrated by the ineffectual trainings, toothless policies, 
checklists, and disempowered diversity offices that compliance 
professionals created on the ground.22 As this Article shows, the problem is 
far more pervasive than even Edelman suggested. 
I present original research showing that privacy standards are being co-
opted into corporate compliance structures that provide little to no 
protection. Each of the stages of legal endogeneity that Edelman noted is 
evident. Some of privacy law’s most important tools—including privacy by 
design, consent requirements, and FTC consent decrees—are so unclear that 
professionals on the ground have wide latitude to frame the law’s 
requirements, kicking endogeneity into high gear. Where rules are clear, 
they are so process-oriented that technological tools can create paper trails 
that may take the place of actual adherence to the law. And because those 
determining privacy law’s meaning often reflect corporate or managerial—
rather than consumer—interests, consumers more often than not lose out. 
Scholars have documented the role that chief privacy officers (CPOs)23 
and engineers24 play in implementing privacy law. But they are not alone.25 
Compliance professionals, marketing officers, outside auditors, human 
resource experts, and in-house and firm lawyers, just to name a few, 
 
20. Id. at 14. 
21. Id. at 12–13.  
22. Id. at 11. 
23. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: 
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015) (describing how nine 
leading privacy professionals at multinational corporations fill in gaps left open by privacy law); 
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 247 (2011) (similar). 
24. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659 (2018) (arguing 
that engineers integrate a narrow vision of privacy law into the designs of technology products they 
create). 
25. As the sociologists of technology Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch have shown, there are many 
social groups influencing the use, perceptions of, and social construction of new technologies. Trevor J. 
Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of 
Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 11 (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 2012) (describing the authors’ social 
construction of technology, or SCOT, model). 











“managerialize” privacy law, bringing in and prioritizing neoliberal values 
of efficiency and innovation in the implementation of privacy law.26 They 
help shift the locus of legal decision-making from the legislature to the C-
suite, think about privacy in managerial terms, and often create symbolic 
structures of compliance—from paper trails to formalistic, but insubstantial 
privacy checklists—with the goal of minimizing the risk of privacy 
litigation, investigation, and exogenous shocks, not of enhanced privacy 
protection for consumers.  
There are, indeed, many privacy professionals working hard to protect 
consumer privacy. But they are pushing against a powerful tide. If left 
unabated, privacy’s managerialization will have profound and troubling 
implications for privacy law, the technology industry, users, and society. As 
more technology companies paint creative pictures of their legal 
compliance, lawyers and judges become more likely to defer to the toothless 
structures companies create by either accepting them as evidence of 
substantive adherence to the law27 or actually incorporating them into 
statutes, thereby undermining the capacity for law to achieve more robust 
privacy protections for users.28 This does real damage to our quest for more 
privacy. 
It also undermines the rule of law. The rise of merely symbolic structures 
neuters the ability of legislation to enact social policy: why pass a law to 
achieve positive social change if its goals are going to be frustrated in 
practice? Moreover, as the locus of legal decision-making shifts further 
away from policymakers to corporate managers, the substantive and 
procedural protections in the laws on the books may dissipate.29  
This is a critical moment in the fight against the false hegemony of 
symbolic compliance in privacy law. Laws like the GDPR and the CCPA 
are still new, the FTC’s agile approach to consumer protection can be 
redirected away from blind deference to corporate structures, and 
consumers have a chance to make their collective voices heard. We can still 
reverse course. There are roles for compliance and compliance professionals 
to play, but the use of process to undermine substance is not one of them. 
All levels of the consumer privacy ecosystem—from lawmakers to civil 
society to academics—can aid in this effort. Crafting an approach to privacy 
 
26. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 143–47. 
27. See Ian Kerr & Carissima Mathen, Chief Justice John Roberts Is a Robot (Apr. 1, 2014) 
(working paper) (on file with University of Ottawa), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i 
d=3395885 (discussing the difference between mere compliance and actual adherence to the law). 
28. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 153–96 (describing how law has deferred to and 
incorporated the symbolic structures of Title VII compliance). 
29. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008) 













law that advances both corporate and consumer interests will require 
understanding how we got here; how lawyers, consultants, and technology 
vendors can do better; and how the social process of law can honestly 
translate privacy’s laws on the books to real privacy protections on the 
ground. These are the goals of this Article. 
Part I pushes back against the temptation to talk about law in a vacuum. 
Rather, this Part describes the ecosystem of what I call the social practice 
of privacy law, including the lawyers, regulators, state attorneys general, 
CPOs, privacy professionals, in-house engineers, and vendors, among other 
social groups, that play critical roles in implementing privacy law on the 
ground. Part II describes the narrative of legal endogeneity and argues that 
some compliance approaches can undermine substantive privacy 
protections for consumers by facilitating the creation of merely symbolic 
structures of compliance. This section relies on new primary source 
material, qualitative and quantitative research, and insights into privacy 
compliance inside technology companies never before discussed in the 
literature. I demonstrate for the first time how different social groups within 
a corporate organization and their approaches to privacy law contribute to 
the problem. Finally, Part III addresses the dangers of legal endogeneity 
head on, identifying ways in which companies can actually support 
substantive, pro-consumer privacy law, and recommending changes to the 
law and how we can better translate the promise of privacy law into practice. 
I conclude with a summary of my findings, responses to potential 
objections, and a discussion of next steps in this research agenda. 
Before I begin my analysis, I would like to briefly discuss my research 
methods. Because the different social actors involved in privacy compliance 
are underexplored, I conducted primary source research to identify market 
players and analyze the ways in which they, and their relationships to 
privacy professionals, engineers, and lawyers, are affecting privacy law. I 
attended privacy industry conferences, including the International 
Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) national conference, “Privacy. 
Security. Risk. 2017”; the 2018 and 2019 International Privacy+Security 
Fora; the 2018 Privacy+Security Forum, organized by leading privacy 
scholars Dan Solove and Paul Schwartz; the Annual Forum of the European 
School of Management and Technology (ESMT); and CyberWeek 2018, 
organized by the University of Tel Aviv.30 At these conferences, I met and 
either scheduled or conducted semi-structured interviews with privacy 
 
30. The author was invited to speak at the IAPP conference, the ESMT Annual Forum, 
CyberWeek 2018, and the 2019 International Privacy+Security Forum. Funding for travel to the IAPP 
conference, the ESMT Annual Forum, and CyberWeek 2018 was provided by the organizers of those 
conferences. 











professionals in various industries, including high technology, aerospace, 
retail, finance, and travel.  
Based on this work, desk research, industry profiles, and advice from 
leading privacy scholars, I identified third-party compliance vendors in the 
privacy space. I distributed a survey and conducted interviews with 
individuals at technology companies and their vendors to elicit themes in 
their conceptualization of privacy and their responsibilities to their clients. 
I used interviews with representatives to follow up on and fill gaps in 
publicly available information about their services. Many were eager to 
speak about their work. To varying degrees, interviewees either received 
permission to speak on the record as a representative of their employer or 
preferred to speak anonymously pursuant to confidentiality agreements. 
Public comments in news outlets and research conducted by other scholars 
also informed my research. 
In order to determine how privacy professionals, lawyers, and 
compliance vendors understood privacy law and how they conceptualized 
their responsibilities and goals, and to minimize response biases from 
surveys,31 I participated in webinars hosted by companies and the IAPP, 
read their and law firm blogs, and reviewed articles in industry journals 
geared toward privacy professionals. This research supplemented a twenty-
month-long project of interviewing leading figures in the privacy and design 
space, including privacy professionals, in-house and firm lawyers, and 
engineers engaged in design.32 Primary source fieldwork also supplemented 
traditional legal research into privacy statutes, cases, and regulatory orders, 
both in the United States and in Europe. European privacy law was included 
because of the outsized impact the GDPR is already having on technology 
companies worldwide. 
I. THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF PRIVACY LAW 
Most scholars approach privacy law as a top-down phenomenon, 
studying how constitutional law, legislation, and court decisions affect the 
 
31. Response bias refers to a series of tendencies in which survey respondents do not answer 
questions honestly. I was particularly concerned with what social scientists call social desirability bias, 
where survey respondents answer questions in ways that make them appear more favorable to the 
experimenter. See, e.g., Anton J. Nederhof, Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias: A Review, 
15 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 263 (1985) (collecting the literature). 
32. This series of interviews included those conducted for a related research project. See 
Waldman, supra note 24, at 678–79 (discussing research methodology). Those interviewees were 
originally identified via snowball sampling, but biases of the data set were limited by use of more 
randomized interview recruitment (at engineering conferences and through listservs). See James S. 
Coleman, Relational Analysis: The Study of Social Organizations with Survey Methods, HUM. ORG., 












collection and use of our data.33 Though undoubtedly essential, this fertile 
research agenda is incomplete. Insufficient attention has been paid to the 
social structures on the ground—the people, professional organizations, and 
corporations—that not only turn law into action, but do far more work than 
legislators and judges in determining what the law means in practice.  
A. The Legal Experts 
That is starting to change. Several scholars have studied how real people 
affect privacy law. Chris Hoofnagle, Daniel Solove, and Woodrow Hartzog 
have shown how FTC commissioners assumed the role of de facto privacy 
regulators under their authority to police “unfair and deceptive” business 
practices.34 It did not have to be that way. By the late 1990s, FTC 
commissioners recognized that digital and internet technologies were 
changing the commercial relationship between producers and consumers, 
saddling the latter with privacy risks while gifting the former opportunities 
for predation and manipulation.35 The FTC’s assertion of regulatory power 
has been so successful that lawyers and privacy professionals treat FTC 
consent decrees as a kind of common law from which to learn details about 
their legal obligations.36 
Danielle Citron recognized that practitioners on the ground can also 
affect the implementation of privacy laws when she explored the agile 
privacy work of state attorneys general (AGs), long active but overlooked 
privacy enforcers.37 Citron found that state AGs can effectively implement 
the privacy laws their legislatures pass and can set policy through 
enforcement activity because they benefit from a combination of broad legal 
authority, local knowledge, office specialization, and coordination with 
 
33. For example, Orin Kerr has studied the Fourth Amendment in a long research agenda too 
voluminous to cite here. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Cross-Enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 471 (2018); Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 1117 (2017). Neil Richards has explored the interaction between privacy and the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1149 (2005). So has Margot Kaminski. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the 
Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski et al., SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What 
Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481 (2017).  
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). The 
FTC was given the authority to prevent such practices in subsection (a)(2). 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); see 
also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 599–600; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 14, at 119–23. 
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1–3 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2 
000/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K3U-55YR]. 
36. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 607. 
37. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 747 (2016) (showing how state attorneys general can be more effective than federal 
regulators at privacy enforcement, but also face certain hurdles and employ ineffective policies). 











colleagues across the country.38 They are also less constrained by the 
politics that can paralyze federal agencies.39 As a result, state AGs have 
become the “front line[] of privacy enforcement.”40 In 2017, for example, 
state AGs, alone or in concert, reached settlements on data breach and 
privacy claims with Target,41 Lenovo,42 Hilton,43 VIZIO,44 and a handful of 
other corporations, and initiated actions against Equifax.45  
They have also had a substantial impact on defining what the law means 
and how it will be implemented. Guidance documents like California’s 
mobile privacy-focused Privacy on the Go provide examples of what 
companies should and should not do to comply with various state privacy 
laws.46 And Making Your Privacy Practices Public takes the vague 
requirement in the California Online Privacy Protection Act that privacy 
policies should be “conspicuous”47 and translates that into specific 
recommendations on readability and design.48 The Texas AG’s office took 
generalized language in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and 
concluded that collecting location data from anyone under thirteen years old 
violates the law.49 And the California AG has convened working groups 
with Silicon Valley technology companies and persuaded them to adopt 
certain practices, not explicitly required by state law, on mobile privacy and 
 
38. See id. at 786–95. 
39. See id. at 750, 786. 
40. Id. at 749. 
41. Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In re Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Att’y Gen. 
of the State of N.Y., of Target Corp., No. 17-094 (May 15, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ny 
ag_target_settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/927E-U5GN]. 
42. Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra Announces $3.5M 
Settlement with Lenovo for Preinstalling Software that Compromised Security of Its Computers (Sept. 
5, 2017), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-35m-settlement-le 
novo-preinstalling-software [https://perma.cc/C9PT-7VWJ]. 
43. Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $700,000 Joint 
Settlement with Hilton After Data Breach Exposed Hundreds of Thousands of Credit Card Numbers 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-700000-joint-settlement-hi 
lton-after-data-breach-exposed [https://perma.cc/AEV5-PDCV]. 
44. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment, Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. 
VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases17/Vizio-Order.p 
df [https://perma.cc/U6NZ-HQGJ]. 
45. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Transfer of Actions to the Northern 
District of Georgia and for Consolidation Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, In re Equifax, Inc. Data Breach 
Litig., MDL No. 2800 (J.P.M.L. Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.almcms.com/contrib/content/uploads/s 
ites/292/2017/09/Equifax-MDL-motion.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4ZC-W6VN]. 
46. See, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ON THE GO: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM (2013), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ 
privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDZ5-VZJ2]; Citron, supra note 37, at 760. 
47. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (West 2018). 
48. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES 
PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY 9–10 (2014), https://oa 
g.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/QMZ6-2G7U]. 












nonconsensual pornography.50 State AGs may not have written the privacy 
laws.51 However, as Citron showed, they infuse the law with pro-consumer 
values and play a critical role in their construction and practical 
implementation. 
Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan studied how chief privacy 
officers (CPOs) also fill gaps left open by privacy law.52 Through a series 
of interviews with privacy professionals recognized as leaders in their 
fields,53 Bamberger and Mulligan concluded that CPOs saw their 
companies’ responsibilities as more than just compliance; rather, legal rules 
provided a floor.54 Several American CPOs talked about their jobs in 
fiduciary terms: they were “steward[s]” of data and “responsibl[e]” to 
consumers.55 In short, some CPOs saw their primary objective as creating 
and maintaining “the company’s trusted relationship” with customers, 
employees, and society.56 And their profile is increasing. The position of 
CPO emerged in the 1990s in the financial and health sectors and expanded 
to other industries over the following ten years.57 Today, 47,164 people on 
LinkedIn list “chief privacy officer,” “deputy chief privacy officer,” or other 
upper- or middle-management level privacy positions as their current 
employment.58  
B. Shifting Privacy Responsibilities 
FTC commissioners and state AGs share one essential quality: they are 
charged with public governance and social welfare functions.59 But, in 
 
50. See id. at 759 n.60, 774. 
51. As Citron noted, however, “state AGs have proposed and endorsed . . . privacy and data 
security laws” and “routinely testify” on Capitol Hill to influence federal policy. Id. at 758–59; see also 
Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New 
Federalism, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 2003, at 37, 39 (discussing the legislative role of attorneys 
general). 
52. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 23; Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 23.  
53. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 23, at 11–12, 40–43, 59 (discussing the authors’ 
research methodology, including the focus on corporate executives). 
54. Id. at 60, 64. 
55. Id. at 66.  
56. Id. at 67. 
57. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 23, at 261. 
58. Based on a LinkedIn Premium Advanced Search conducted on December 6, 2018 filtered by 
“job titles” using the search terms “chief privacy officer.” This is an imperfect metric for measuring 
reach of privacy professionals today, but it does give a flavor for how the market has grown since the 
first CPOs in the 1990s.  
59. Every attorney general is a lawyer. Every FTC commissioner since 1989, the earliest date 
available on the FTC’s webpage, has been a lawyer. See Former Commissioners, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/former-commissioners [https://perma.cc/JLP2 
-JGBP]. And although CPOs do not always have to have J.D. degrees, the IAPP recently found that six 
in ten privacy professionals at large companies have law degrees. IAPP, BENCHMARKING PRIVACY 
MANAGEMENT AND INVESTMENTS OF THE FORTUNE 1000: REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM 2014 RESEARCH 











reality, many legal policy decisions are made by social groups far from 
those charged to protect citizens. Online platforms employ armies of content 
moderators to negotiate internal speech rules60 and make fair use 
determinations in copyright law.61 We outsource constitutional 
responsibilities to police officers, who make practical interpretations of 
search and seizure law in the moment.62 Catherine Crump argues that 
surveillance policy is made by vendors hired by the government.63 We are 
increasingly outsourcing judicial decision-making to mediators and 
arbitrators who hear evidence, consider legal arguments, and issue binding 
orders.64 And CPOs, lawyers, and compliance personnel create an internal 
“company law” of privacy.65 
Privacy decisions on the ground are similar. Elsewhere, I explored how 
engineers employed by technology companies instantiate a particular vision 
of privacy law in the products they create.66 Because of the networks they 
sit in and their proximity to the design process,67 engineers have outsized 
 
10, https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/2014_Benchmarking_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKK 
8-NJG4]. 
60. See generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET (2018) (profiling the 
content moderation industry, its practices, and effects); see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The 
People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (describing 
how online platforms like Facebook employ, train, and deploy large teams of content moderators to 
make decisions about hate speech and copyright infringement). 
61. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that online 
platforms engaged in content moderation must consider fair use before removing material).  
62. See GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF POLICE 
DISCRETION 5 (1982) (calling attention to police discretion because law enforcement officers are 
architects of policy in society); see also JOHN L. COOPER, YOU CAN HEAR THEM KNOCKING 106 (1981) 
(“Police interpretation of the law helps to operationalize its legal authority, and to that degree the 
legality of the criminal justice system, in terms of all the laws that are administered. For this reason, it 
can be said that the police become the embodiment of the law . . . .”). 
63. See Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595 
(2016) (arguing that advanced technology is often obtained by local law enforcement through the 
procurement process without meaningful input from citizens and political leaders). 
64. See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 16–43 (2016); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory 
Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 20 (2003) (binding arbitration takes 
away the opportunity for a trial); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, 
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). 
65. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 23. 
66. See Waldman, supra note 24 (arguing that theory, law, corporate organization, and the social 
experience and education of engineers hamper the diffusion of privacy norms throughout a company 
and into products). 
67. This argument reflects actor-network theory (ANT), developed by the science and 
technology studies scholars Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. See, e.g., Michel Callon, The Sociology of 
an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle, in MAPPING THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY: SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE IN THE REAL WORLD 19 (Michel Callon, John Law & Arie Rip 
eds., 1986). ANT generally posits that artifacts (like machines) do not just emerge out of nowhere; rather, 
they come into existence as products of social relations, or actor-networks, like those that exist within a 
technology company. BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-












power to translate privacy law into design. Through first-person interviews, 
observations of corporate design processes, and analyses of internal privacy 
standards and protocols, I found that, at least for some engineers in the high 
technology sector, the kind of consumer privacy they considered during 
design differed from the more robust conception of privacy coming out of 
CPOs’ offices. Where CPOs may think about privacy in terms of trust, many 
engineers think about choice architecture.68 Where privacy professionals 
create company-wide protocols and trainings to help integrate privacy into 
design, many engineers make privacy decisions ad hoc and often prioritize 
efficiency, speed, and other engineering values over privacy.69 Where 
corporate privacy teams may work hard to persuade their bosses that privacy 
is important and even good for business, engineers fall back on their 
education and social experiences with other technologists at work to shift 
the focus elsewhere.70 This means that in some cases, privacy law71 and the 
visions of earnest and hardworking privacy professionals are not being fully 
realized; the engineers whose job it is to translate internal privacy rules into 
design have different, sometimes contradictory, priorities, backgrounds, and 
views.  
Frustrating the integration of robust privacy protections into technology 
design is just one effect of shifting the locus of privacy law decision-making 
from policymakers to corporate actors. Such a shift can undermine 
substantive and procedural safeguards, replace transparency with opacity, 
and short circuit deliberative decision-making with quick compliance-based 
 
Theory of Design, 1 DESIGN & CULTURE 273 (2009). But see Susan Leigh Star, Power, Technology and 
the Phenomenology of Conventions, in TECHNOSCIENCE: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTIONS 79, 88–99 
(Kristin Asdal, Brita Brenna & Ingunn Moser eds., 2007) (criticizing ANT as focusing too much on the 
efforts of (mostly male) designers and marginalizing the contributions of others). 
68. See Waldman, supra note 24, at 681–85. 
69. Id. at 685–89, 711–16. 
70. Id. at 716–25. 
71. This includes the principle of privacy by design. Privacy by design is the idea that the privacy 
of consumers should be considered from the beginning and throughout the design process of new 
technologies rather than tacked on at the end. The idea has been around since at least the European 
Union’s Privacy Directive, which the GDPR replaced. See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46; see also 
ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE SEVEN FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), http://www.pr 
ivacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UM3-PGC 
E]. It has more recently received more systematic scholarly attention. See HUMAN VALUES AND THE 
DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (Batya Friedman ed., 1997) (challenging the idea that efficiency 
and functionality are the central foci of design and showing how values are integrated into new 
products); WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018); MARY FLANAGAN & HELEN NISSENBAUM, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL 
GAMES (2014); Katie Shilton, Technology Development with an Agenda: Interventions to Emphasize 
Values in Design, 47 PROC. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2010). 











answers.72 There is another risk, one which this Article explores: the 
managerialization of privacy law compliance by compliance professionals 
and engineers can threaten to replace real pro-consumer progress with mere 
symbols of compliance, undermining the promise of pro-privacy laws. 
II. UNDERMINING PRIVACY LAW 
FTC commissioners, AG offices, and corporate CPOs impact the 
framing of privacy law. But the center of gravity is still unsettled. Privacy 
law is being defined, negotiated, and practiced by an army of compliance 
professionals, auditors, and engineers. Many of them put form over 
substance to frame privacy law in narrow, compliance-based, and 
managerially focused ways. They are, in other words, putting privacy on a 
path to what Lauren Edelman called legal endogeneity and symbolic 
compliance.73 
This Part describes legal endogeneity and traces the endogeneity of 
privacy law, teasing out four related implications. First, although many 
privacy professionals and their lawyers earnestly want to help their 
companies comply with the letter and spirit of privacy law, their framing of 
corporate privacy obligations as minimizing risk to the company and their 
reliance on paper trails and checklists can undermine that commitment.74 
Second, many compliance professionals create symbolic structures of 
compliance that often—though certainly not always—ossify into 
compliance in name only.75 Third, this emerging legal endogeneity reflects 
neoliberal managerialization and exemplifies the dangers such an approach 
poses to the rule of law.76 Fourth, and finally, although legal endogeneity is 
taking hold in privacy law, with statutes and regulatory orders already 
incorporating the mere presence of symbolic structures as evidence of 
compliance with privacy law, this process is incomplete.77 We can change 
course. 
A. Legal Endogeneity 
In her book, Working Law, Edelman showed how form over substance 
in corporate compliance with civil rights law was having a deleterious effect 
on real progress toward workplace equality. Edelman wanted to understand 
 
72. Danielle Citron identified similar implications of the increasing use of automated tools in 
public agency decision-making. See Citron, supra note 29, at 1254–55. 
73. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 12, 14. 
74. See infra Part II.B.2. 
75. See infra Part II.B.2–II.B.5. 
76. See infra Part II.C. 












why, fifty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the 
establishment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
“substantial workplace inequality on the basis of race, sex, and other 
protected categories persist[ed].”78 Although there could be many reasons 
for failure, her research suggested that rather than enforcing the substance 
of civil rights laws, courts and the EEOC were deferring to the in-house 
structures—trainings, anti-discrimination policies, complaint procedures, 
and diversity officers, just to name a few—companies had developed in the 
wake of the Civil Rights Act as evidence that they were actually complying 
with the law, even when those companies still failed to hire or promote 
minorities.79  
Sometimes, these structures have important expressive effects:80 a policy 
of nondiscrimination is a first step toward embedding nondiscrimination in 
the ethos of a company.81 But they can also be a glossy veneer for 
noncompliance. For example, a company can have a nondiscrimination 
policy, but never enforce it; it can hire a diversity officer, but give her office 
no power; it can develop extensive internal hearing procedures to deal with 
alleged bias, but use review boards to deny all claims.82 These symbols were 
nevertheless accepted by the courts as evidence that companies were not 
violating civil rights laws; when an alleged victim of discrimination sues 
her employer, both the lawyers and judges turn to these systems and 
sometimes confuse the existence of compliance structures with actual 
compliance.83 
Edelman also found that legal deference to mere symbols of compliance 
with civil rights laws was not accidental. Rather, it was part of the 
endogenous development of law, a process in which compliance 
 
78. EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 6–10 (providing statistical evidence for ongoing racial and 
gender inequality in the workplace).  
79. Id. at 11, 153–96. 
80. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 404–14 (2009) (discussing how the law is necessary for persuading 
individuals, platforms, and the law to take seriously that cyber harassment is gender discrimination); 
Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (2000) 
(law is coercive and expressive of norms); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022, 2031 (1996) (law tells people what is socially harmful and signals appropriate 
behavior). 
81. Adopting Bruno Latour’s distinction between the “ostensive” and the “performative” aspects 
of behavior, Martha Feldman and Brian Pentland argue that executives are responsible for the 
“ostensive” aspect of routines: setting the tone for action, laying out a mission, and creating policies that 
form best practice guides. Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational 
Routines as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 94, 100–102 (2003). Then, routines 
are “performed” by workers on the ground: real people doing real work translating the mission into 
action, products, and widgets. Id.; see also Bruno Latour, The Powers of Association, 32 SOC. REV. 264, 
266–68, 271–73 (1984). 
82. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 14. 
83. See id. at 168–73. 











professionals played a starring, yet frustrating, role. Sociologists of law 
argue that law is a product of social relations: lobbying, social movements, 
bureaucracies, arguments in adversarial proceedings, and the organized 
legal profession, to name just a few.84 Indeed, it is even the product of the 
environment it seeks to regulate; judges and legislators often come from 
industry or have experience representing industry players.85 This, combined 
with a professional tendency among compliance officers to fully document 
their work, lends itself to reliance on shorthand heuristics to prove 
compliance with the law.86 The result can be a perverse practice of law: 
instead of looking for evidence of substantive progress or adherence to legal 
principles, courts end up deferring to the veneer of compliance that 
companies create. 
In particular, Edelman noticed six stages of legal endogeneity that 
ultimately undermined workplace antidiscrimination law, illustrated in 
Figure 1.87 
 
84. Id. at 21. 
85. See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 674–
80 (2013) (noting how regulatory capture impairs agencies’ ability to serve as litigation gatekeepers); 
see also Lee Fang, The Reverse Revolving Door: How Corporate Insiders Are Rewarded Upon Leaving 
Firms for Congress, NATION (May 4, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/reverse-revolving-door-
how-corporate-insiders-are-rewarded-upon-leaving-firms-congres/ [https://perma.cc/24D9-FULM] 
(providing examples of industry players moving into policymaking roles). 
86. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 170–71. 

























Edelman argues that the process starts when a legislature passes a law 
with ambiguous or vague requirements.88 Title VII and the other statutes 
that constitute the ecosystem of employment discrimination law do not 
specify the meaning of discrimination or “equal employment 
opportunity.”89 Nor do they specify how courts should determine if an 
employer is engaging in discrimination. These ambiguities may be the result 
of the legislative drafting process,90 but regardless of their origin, they leave 
the door open to wildly different interpretations from those responsible for 
compliance on the ground.  
But vagueness is not the only problem. Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination in the workplace sets a goal of nondiscrimination, but does 
not state how to get there. Other laws require specific actions. For example, 
a rule could mandate safe driving or reasonableness, or it could set a fifty-
five MPH speed limit or define specific responsibilities to others. Edelman’s 
focus on Title VII’s vagueness—the statute’s failure to define 
discrimination or equality—implies that vague standards are susceptible to 
legal endogeneity.91 But she also notes that Title VII cases like Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson,92 which suggested that a functional anti-harassment 
policy and grievance procedure could shield a corporate defendant from 
sexual harassment liability,93 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,94 which 
established Meritor’s suggestion as an official affirmative defense,95 gave 
employers a process-oriented escape hatch from substantive adherence to a 
law that prohibits sexual harassment.96 This suggests vagueness is not the 
 
88. This is an endogenous process in itself, which suggests that the process of legal endogeneity 
and symbolic compliance may be more of a loop than a continuum. See id. at 28 (conceptualizing the 
stages of legal endogeneity in a spiral). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (as amended). 
90. See, e.g., PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985); see also 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case 
Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594–96 (2002) (documenting “deliberate ambiguity” in statutes); Joseph 
A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity 
in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640–41 (2002) (arguing that ambiguity 
in statutes serves legislative purposes like compromise even though the law has developed a variety of 
interpretive techniques to derive meaning out of ambiguity). 
91. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 42–55 (focusing on Title VII’s vagueness). 
92. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
93. Id. at 72–73 (rejecting the view that the mere presence of a grievance procedure is enough to 
escape liability, but recognizing the potential for such procedures to insulate companies from liability if 
the “procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward”). 
94. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
95. Id. at 777–78 (“[A] defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . The defense comprises two necessary 
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” (citation 
omitted)). 
96. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. 











only culprit. Meritor and Faragher legitimized protocols, policies, and 
paper trails, even if they hid underlying resistance to Title VII’s goal of 
gender equality. Therefore, Edelman focused not just on vague standards, 
but on what happens when they combine with process-oriented performance 
rules. 
Legislative ambiguity and process-oriented rules give corporate 
professionals—lawyers, consultants, and compliance experts, for 
example—the chance to define what the law means and protect their 
employers. This, after all, is their job: they act as the filter between the law 
and the company. In the civil rights context, human resource professionals 
and in-house counsel play central roles in this process because they design, 
monitor, and administer personnel policy.97 And they used the leeway they 
were given by ambiguous law to conclude that their goal was to minimize 
the risk of litigation for their employer, not actually eliminate bias, 
discrimination, and inequality.98 
These professionals then used the process-oriented parts of the law to 
develop compliance-oriented solutions in response to legal requirements as 
they saw them. Ambiguity in the law allows these professionals to get 
creative, to do their best to comply with their framing of the law without 
substantially interfering with their chief goal—the continued productivity 
and profiting of the company.99 To comply with Title VII in the wake of 
Meritor and Faragher, for example, companies drafted policies, created 
new offices and positions, developed dispute resolution mechanisms and 
reporting structures, hired consultants to craft new approaches, and kept 
detailed paper trails, to name just a few steps.100 And these systems spread 
rapidly through industry as professionals shared their innovations with their 
colleagues.101 
With these systems in place, the law gets managerialized. 
Managerialization refers to the way in which corporate compliance 
structures become the sites at which the law is actually applied and its 
meaning negotiated on a regular basis.102 Julie Cohen has appropriately 
described managerialization of law as a natural outgrowth of a neoliberal 
project that seeks to constrain government regulation aimed at social 
welfare by emphasizing efficiency and innovation in the service of 
 
97. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 30–31. 
98. Id. at 31. 
99. Id. at 31–33. 
100. Id. at 32. 
101. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–49, 153 
(1983). 












industrial and capital production.103 The process helps companies avoid the 
costs of litigation and outsources what they see as cumbersome and analog 
procedures to in-house representatives and even technologies with corporate 
interests in mind. For example, when an employee has a discrimination 
claim, she does not immediately go to a judge or even a lawyer. She tells 
her diversity officer, a corporate employee, who may ask for proof, at which 
point the allegation may be transferred to an in-house review team. In-house 
lawyers will get involved and companies will use processes that look very 
much like adversarial proceedings or dispute resolution, yet with few of a 
court’s protections and rights for aggrieved plaintiffs. Instead, at each point, 
the professionals determining what the law means and how to apply it in 
any given circumstance are the in-house lawyers and compliance 
professionals who developed the structures in the first place.104 
Corporations then mobilize these structures to push back when 
employees try to vindicate their rights. In the Title VII context, research has 
shown that companies erect procedural barriers for discrimination victims. 
Management lawyers also discourage them from going through internal 
processes even as those same lawyers leverage those structures to quash 
employee attempts to use the courts.105 Edelman found that this had three 
negative effects on the law’s capacity to create real change: it discouraged 
individuals from taking action in response to rights violations,106 allowed 
compliance structures to enter into the legal consciousness as evidence of 
real progress,107 and transformed the few workplace discrimination 
proceedings into debates over structures rather than civil rights.108 
The final stage of legal endogeneity is deference to symbolic structures, 
or when corporate compliance systems become embedded in institutional 
interpretations of law. This happens in three progressive steps. In workplace 
discrimination cases, judges will start by mentioning that corporate 
 
103. See Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 71, 72–73, 83–90 (2014) (reconceptualizing neoliberalism and its relation to legal theory); see 
also COHEN, supra note 17, at 143–47. 
104. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 33–39.  
105. Id. at 158–67. 
106. Id. at 37; see also KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1992) (arguing, among other things, that companies actively discourage 
employees from turning to the courts to vindicate their rights). 
107. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 37–38. By “legal consciousness,” Edelman was referring to 
“the set of shared beliefs and ideas that both draw on and constitute the meaning of law.” Id. at 154. 
Susan Silbey, one of the leading scholars who helped develop the concept, has called it “conceptually 
tortured” and recommended abandoning it entirely. Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 324 (2005). That said, the idea remains relevant as a path for understanding 
the connection between, on the one hand, how people tend to experience and understand the law, and 
how people behave under the law, on the other. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE 
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); see also LAURA BETH NIELSEN, 
LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC SPEECH (2004). 
108. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 38. 











defendants have systems in place, including diversity officers and internal 
dispute resolution processes. Over time, these mentions become evidence in 
the factual question of whether discrimination actually occurred. Finally, 
some compliance structures become so closely associated with the legal 
consciousness, that judges simply take their mere presence as sufficient 
evidence that a company did not engage in discrimination.109 There are 
many reasons why this has happened in Title VII cases: judicial preference 
for heuristics in decision-making, specific decisions in which federal courts 
noted that compliance structures would have helped a defendant’s case,110 
the increasingly common tendency for lawyers on both sides of 
discrimination cases to refer to these structures in their briefs,111 and judicial 
politics,112 among other factors.  
All this has the effect of conflating a tool of compliance with actual 
adherence to the substantive requirements of law. And the more that 
happens, the more these structures of compliance enter our collective 
consciousness about what the law requires. But symbols of compliance and 
actual compliance are two different things. When we conflate the two, the 
result is the frustration of Title VII’s goal of a more equal workplace and a 
collective impression that law, and the system it supports, is ineffective. 
B. Legal Endogeneity in Privacy Law 
A similar narrative is playing out in privacy law today. Ambiguous 
privacy rules, from the GDPR to FTC consent decrees, with process-
oriented regulatory levers open the door for companies to frame the law in 
ways that serve corporate, rather than consumer, interests. The compliance 
ecosystem, from lawyers to privacy professionals to engineers, dominates 
the social practice of privacy law because these compliance professionals, 
not legislators or regulators, embed their vision into corporate practice and 
technology design. And these groups create structures that proliferate 
throughout the privacy compliance market, thus impacting the legal 
consciousness; judges, regulators, lawyers, and even consumers are starting 
to assume that the mere presence of compliance structures is evidence of 
substantive adherence with the law. But this narrative may not be as 
 
109. See id. at 173. 
110. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (creating an explicit 
affirmative defense that would allow employers to escape liability if they tried to respond to harassment 
allegations and had a grievance procedure that the employee declined to pursue); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72–73 (1986) (holding that although the mere presence of a grievance procedure 
and nondiscrimination policy did not insulate it from liability, the defendant’s argument and position 
could have benefited from a more specific policy and a more streamlined procedure). 
111. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 170–72. 












indelible as Edelman fears it is for Title VII and workplace equality.113 This 
Part establishes the narrative of legal endogeneity in privacy law and maps 
the ways in which different groups in the social practice of privacy law are 
contributing to the erosion of substantive privacy protection. 
1. Ambiguity and Process in Privacy Law 
Privacy law’s flexible definitions114 and standards,115 sometimes 
challenging even in the hands of lawyers, are particularly vulnerable to 
being weakened and undermined by symbolic structures. Whenever a new 
 
113. Id. at 223–25 (explaining why, despite providing recommendations for reversing the 
endogeneity of civil rights law, material success will be difficult and unlikely). 
114. There is a rich tradition of scholars exploring the meaning of privacy. Almost all of them 
recognize its malleability. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, 
DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971) (finding privacy “difficult to define because it is exasperatingly 
vague and evanescent”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977) 
(noting that privacy has a “protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers”); Robert C. Post, Three 
Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001) (noting that “[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so 
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings” 
that it is difficult to define it at all). That has not stopped scholars from trying. Privacy has been defined 
as a right to be left alone, the capacity to control what others know about us, the ability to protect intimate 
information, the liberty-affirming need to develop new ideas free of social pressure, controlling the 
appropriate flow of information, protecting our bodily and sexual integrity, and the negotiation of 
disclosure in relationships of trust, just to name a few. See JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND 
ISOLATION 56 (1992); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF 
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8 (2000); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 90, 94, 102–04 (2004); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870 (2019); Jean L. Cohen, The Necessity of 
Privacy, 68 SOC. RES. 318, 319 (2001); Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE 
L.J. 475, 484 (1968); Steve Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351, 351 (2010); 
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
431 (2016); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); 
Howard B. White, The Right to Privacy, 18 SOC. RES. 171, 180–81 (1951); Jonathan Zittrain, What the 
Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2000); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN 
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND 
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION 
PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018). 
115. Discussions about the relative merits of rules versus flexible standards are beyond the scope 
of this Article. Duncan Kennedy originally described rules and standards as setting up a dialectical form 
of argument. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1689–90 (1976). Ronald Dworkin emphasized the role standards play in realizing substantive legal 
principles. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967) 
(distinguishing between principles and rules in order to explain the important role of standards that are 
not rules); see also, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42–53 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383–420 (1985) (examining the 
form and rhetoric of the rules versus standards debate). 











law comes into effect, decision makers on the ground are empowered to 
adapt, consider changes in context, and assess what is best under the 
circumstances,116 especially before a court of law has a chance to have its 
say. But vague laws can be particularly problematic. The “staggeringly 
complex” and “ambiguous”117 GDPR lays out several of these broad 
standards that need to be given “specific substance over time.”118 Until that 
happens, regulated companies have room to determine what the law means. 
Consider just a few examples: Article 25 of the GDPR calls for privacy 
“by design and by default.”119 But beyond a general understanding that it 
refers to making privacy part of the design process for new technologies, 
what privacy by design means in practice is far from clear.120 Even guidance 
documents from the Article 29 Working Party, an advisory group of data 
protection authorities from across Europe,121 add little clarity, noting only 
that companies that “place privacy and data protection at the forefront of 
product development will be well placed to ensure that their goods and 
services respect the principles of privacy by design.”122 And scholars have 
suggested a variety of definitions, ranging from vague privacy principles123 
 
116. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744–45 (1995). 
117. Alison Cool, Europe’s Data Protection Law Is a Big, Confusing Mess, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/opinion/gdpr-europe-data-protection.html [https://perma. 
cc/ST82-9STL]. 
118. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 
195 (2019). 
119. See GDPR, supra note 9, art. 25, at 48. 
120. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239 (2019) (noting 
that Article 25 has failed to articulate foundational elements of how to achieve privacy by design in 
practice). The word “design” can mean many different things, from intentions (something is done “by 
design”) to aesthetics (a room can be designed to be visually appealing). But for the purposes of this 
Article, I follow the broad definition outlined by Woodrow Hartzog, who defines design as the 
“processes that create consumer technologies and the results of their creative process instantiated in 
hardware and software.” HARTZOG, supra note 71, at 11.  
121. Since 1997, the Working Party, now, with some minor changes, called the European Data 
Protection Board, has issued 240 statements, reports, opinions, and recommendations to help companies 
comply with European data protection rules. See Opinions and Recommendations, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/index_en.htm [https://pe 
rma.cc/K6V9-AR4V]. 
122. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 8/2014 ON THE RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS 3 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp223_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T7T-KRNR]. 
Its advice to companies working in the Internet of Things marketplace was to “apply the principles of 
Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default.” Id. at 21. 
123. Ann Cavoukian, the former Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, has 
argued that privacy by design is the “philosophy . . . of embedding privacy into the design specifications 
of technology itself.” ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 1 (2009), 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacybydesign.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8JN-YTF8]; see also 












and privacy-enhancing technologies124 to sets of values125 or “boundaries 
and goals” for design126 to norms based on products liability for design 
defects.127 This ambiguity will persist until we have clear rules. 
The GDPR’s consent requirements are also unclear. If companies want 
to collect ordinary, non-sensitive data, user consent must be 
“unambiguous.”128 If the data is sensitive, including physical and mental 
health information, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, for example, 
consent must be “explicit.”129 The two concepts are not the same,130 but 
neither the GDPR itself nor any interpretive document clarify what steps 
make consent explicit rather than just unambiguous. For example, although 
the European Data Protection Board has stated that “it should be made clear 
that the use of default options which the data subject is required to modify 
in order to reject the processing (consent based on silence) does not in itself 
constitute unambiguous consent,” it never makes clear what kind of positive 
action is required.131  
Alongside the GDPR, privacy professionals in the United States must 
incorporate FTC consent decrees into the legal context in which their 
companies operate.132 But despite a growing agenda as the de facto federal 
 
124. See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis 
of Google and Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1341–42 (2013) (arguing 
that privacy by design requires translating privacy principles into code, both in the back-end 
infrastructure of data collection and front-end user interfaces). 
125. See, e.g., FLANAGAN & NISSENBAUM, supra note 71 (discussing the way in which game 
designers integrate values into their products). 
126. HARTZOG, supra note 71, at 7. 
127. See Waldman, supra note 120 (applying several analogies from the law of products liability 
for design defects to specify what privacy by design should mean in practice). 
128. GDPR, supra note 9, art. 6, at 36 (requiring consent); id. art. 4, at 34 (consent must be 
unambiguous). 
129. Id. art. 9, ¶ 2(a), at 38. 
130. See Note from Presidency to Permanent Representatives Comm., Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation): Analysis of the Final Compromise Text with a View to Agreement 3 (Dec. 15, 2015), http:// 
www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-council-dp-reg-draft-final-compromise-15039-15.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/GH75-UM2L] (“On the final outstanding issues that were discussed in trilogue, the following 
balance was achieved. The way in which consent is to be given by data subjects remains ‘unambiguous’ 
for all processing of personal data, with the clarification that this requires a ‘clear affirmative action’, 
and that consent has to be ‘explicit’ for sensitive data.”). 
131. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 15/2011 ON THE DEFINITION OF 
CONSENT 36 (July 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommenda 
tion/files/2011/wp187_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ4U-DYE7]. The Article 29 Working Party is now 
called the European Data Protection Board. 
132. As part of their research on the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence, Solove and Hartzog interviewed 
leading privacy attorneys who noted that FTC consent decrees are scrutinized by practitioners for insight 
into the current state of the law. See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 607, 621 (quoting Chris 
Wolf, then-director of Hogan Lovells LLP’s privacy and information management practice group). 
Indeed, the FTC intends for its consent orders to have a norm-setting impact. See id. at 622 (quoting 
Toby Levin, a senior attorney with the FTC from 1984 to 2005).  











privacy regulator,133 the FTC often includes vague requirements in its 
consent decrees, giving professionals on the ground wide latitude to 
determine what the law means in practice. 
For example, the FTC ostensibly requires companies to provide 
“adequate” notice to consumers. In FTC v. Frostwire, LLC,134 for example, 
the agency alleged that the company failed to “adequately inform[] 
consumers that [an Android file sharing] application” required several steps 
to protect the privacy of some files.135 In FTC v. Echometrix,136 the FTC 
found that broad statements in its privacy policy were too vague and “failed 
to disclose adequately” the company’s data collection regime.137 And in In 
re Sears Holdings Management Corp.,138 the FTC concluded that Sears’s 
long, legalese licensing agreement “failed to disclose adequately that the 
software application, when installed,” would monitor a long list of 
consumer behavior.139 The FTC has never clarified the meaning of 
adequacy, instead choosing a step-by-step common law approach. Indeed, 
arguably the only piece of the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence that is not left 
open to interpretation on the ground is the FTC’s baseline and clearest rule: 
do not lie.140 
In addition to ambiguity in the law, international privacy law offers data 
collectors a series of process-oriented escape hatches to avoid liability. Each 
route requires a paper trail, thus incenting processes over substance. Under 
the traditional notice-and-consent regime, data collectors can escape 
liability as long as they post their data use practices in a privacy policy.141 
Under the GDPR, data processing records are required,142 and data 
protection impact assessments can protect companies from liability even 
 
133. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”).  
134. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Frostwire, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/doc 
uments/cases/2011/10/111011frostwirecmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/G964-4NU2]. 
135. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
136. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Echometrix, Inc., No. CV10-5516 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/cases/2010/11/101130echometrixcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G79-C962]. 
137. Id. at 4, 5 (emphasis added). 
138. Complaint, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC File No. 082 3099, No. C-4264 (F.T.C. 
Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/09/090604searscmpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3C49-LRLC]. 
139. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
140. That is not to say that the FTC only engages in broken promises litigation. However, most 
scholars agree that broken promises not only constitute the lion’s share of FTC actions, but it is also the 
agency’s clearest requirement of industry. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 629–38 (reviewing 
the FTC’s deception jurisprudence focusing on incidents of lying and misleading statements in privacy 
policies). 
141. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between Meaning and 
Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 41 (2015). 












when engaging in data processing that carries a “high risk to the rights” of 
data subjects.143 
Ambiguous laws and process are nothing new. The limitations of 
language and the legislative drafting process often result in statutes and 
rules that leave their meaning and details to those interpreting them.144 And 
the debate over standards and rules is as old as the common law.145 Margot 
Kaminski argues that seemingly vague terms in the GDPR become clear 
when we combine the GDPR with interpretive tools, including reports from 
the European Data Protection Board. That is, she argues, how it is supposed 
to work.146 Dan Solove and Woodrow Hartzog argue that lawyers and 
privacy professionals may be able to piece together what does and does not 
constitute “adequate” notice from the sum total of FTC consent decrees.147  
But interpretations of the GDPR and FTC actions neither emerge in a 
vacuum nor necessarily take on the color the Board or the FTC intend. 
Rather, interpretations are made by real people affected by biases, social 
influences, and institutional pressures.148 And by the FTC’s own count, the 
agency averages only ten privacy-related cases per year, limiting the sources 
lawyers have from which to glean lessons and find clarity.149 Even if clarity 
is to come in the future, the FTC and data protection authorities will only 
have the opportunity to issue official judgments after protracted 
investigations and litigation. Until then, corporate actors on the ground can 
use their first-mover advantage to entrench their interpretations of the law 
before any court has its say,150 interpreting vague terms in light of corporate, 
 
143. See id. art. 35, at 53. 
144. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 75–76 (2008); Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 90, at 640; Nourse 
& Schacter, supra note 90, at 594–96 (documenting “deliberate ambiguity” in statutes); see also REED 
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43–53 (1975) (discussing how the 
inherent limitations of language create ambiguity in statutes).  
145. Compare, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (establishing a rule 
of contributory negligence in rail crossing cases if the driver does not get out of the car to check for an 
oncoming train), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (holding that the issue of the 
driver’s negligence is a question for the jury, based on a standard of reasonableness); see also, e.g., 
KELMAN, supra note 115, at 15–63; SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 149–55; Duncan Kennedy, supra note 
115, at 1689–90.  
146. See Kaminski, supra note 118, at 195. 
147. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 658–61; see also id. at 650–56 (arguing that, when 
taken together, the FTC’s “adequate security” jurisprudence may have started with a vague standard, but 
has come to include a series of specific rules). 
148. This is one of the core insights of the fields of the sociology of law—namely, that law is a 
social system made up of people and behaviors and a social institution that has an impact on social life. 
See, e.g., JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE 8–20 (2001). 
149. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 600. 
150. The first-mover advantage refers to the benefits that accrue to a company that is first in the 
market. See, e.g., Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of 
Competitive Entry, 1887–1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161, 173 (2001) (noting that a first mover enjoys a kind 
of monopoly that ultimately ebbs with time); William T. Robinson & Sungwook Min, Is the First to 
Market the First to Fail? Empirical Evidence for Industrial Goods Businesses, 39 J. MARKETING RES. 











rather than consumer, values. They leverage their size and resources to 
shape the law in ways that, both in the short and long term, benefit them and 
their interests.151 This is where the real work of the social practice of privacy 
law happens; somewhere between lawmaking and adjudication, the 
regulated have the chance to frame the debate.152 And as the responsibilities 
for legal interpretations increasingly shift to compliance professionals with 
interests not necessarily aligned with their customers, the GDPR’s and the 
FTC’s intent becomes more distant. 
2. Framing Corporate Obligations Narrowly in Terms of Risk 
Avoidance 
Recognizing the ambiguity and process in privacy law, privacy 
professionals on the ground have the opportunity (and responsibility) to 
translate the law’s requirements for their employers in a way that makes 
compliance possible.153 As Edelman describes, these professionals “make 
certain laws or norms visible or invisible to employers and frame those 
laws’ relevance to organizational life.”154 In so doing, they shape the 
“aesthetic of law,” determining not just what laws make it through the filter, 
but what those legal obligations look like.155 Human resources professionals 
and lawyers figure prominently in Edelman’s work on the implementation 
(or lack thereof) of civil rights laws; they frame the work compliance with 
Title VII as minimizing the risk of a lawsuit from an employee, rather than 
actually eradicating sex discrimination in the workplace.156 In the privacy 
space, lawyers,157 CPOs,158 consultants,159 and their staffs should assume the 
 
120, 126 (2002). In this context, I am arguing that companies have the chance to be first movers when 
it comes to interpreting what the law means in practice because courts and regulatory agencies can only 
respond later. 
151. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 139 (describing how patterns of institutional and legal change 
tilt toward advantages for wealthy corporate interests because, as repeat players in the legal system, they 
can argue for positive outcomes in any given case or prospective rule changes that work in their favor). 
152. Id. at 186. 
153. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 23, at 271, 291. 
154. EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 82. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. at 78–80. 
157. In-house counsel operate as the chief filters or “gatekeepers” between the law and corporate 
organizations. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 470 (2000). 
Nelson and Nielsen found that in-house counsel routinely used their legal expertise to advance their 
employers’ financial interests, allowing their companies to make more money, pay fewer taxes, escape 
liability, and reach new markets. Id. at 474–76. Lawyers also needed to maintain their seat at the table 
by “mak[ing] their advice more palatable to businesspeople.” Id. at 477. 
158. See BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 23. 
159. Consultants provide advice and counseling. They can design an internal privacy structure or 
work with in-house teams to build systems to comply with specific laws. They can also serve as 












principal legal filter role and should ideally frame corporate legal 
obligations in terms of the laws’ underlying purposes—namely, to create 
more robust privacy protections, to protect consumers from predatory data 
collection practices, and to minimize privacy risks to consumers.160 
But that is not always what happens. Although there are many privacy 
professionals advocating strongly and effectively for privacy prioritization 
inside technology companies, some professionals frame privacy law 
compliance as a means of minimizing the risk to the company, not 
protecting consumers from data use harms. 
This risk framing pervades the privacy compliance landscape. When the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its 
Privacy Risk Management Framework, it focused on developing standards 
for an organization-wide “program that involves the management of 
organizational risk—that is, the risk to the organization or to individuals 
associated with the operation of a system.”161 In the Journal of Data 
Protection and Privacy, an industry journal offering analysis of international 
privacy developments,162 several articles in the Journal’s first five volumes 
focus on minimizing corporate risk. In The Risk-Based Approach to 
Privacy: Risk or Protection for Business?, for example, the authors 
recognize the GDPR’s requirement that privacy protection mechanisms be 
proportional to the risk data processing poses to users. But the lion’s share 
of the article focuses on how privacy impact assessments (PIAs) can be used 
to mitigate corporate exposure to GDPR penalties.163 Two practical 
 
GDPR compliance” and helps companies with “[r]egulation interpretation[;] . . . [c]ompliance 
solutions—people, process and technology execution for an effective cybersecurity and privacy 
program[; and] [c]ompliance management—monitoring and maintaining controls going forward.” 
GDPR Is Here—Now What?, PROTIVITI, https://www.protiviti.com/US-en/technology-consulting/gener 
al-data-protection-regulation [https://perma.cc/7UPE-NPEH]. Galexia helps companies “understand 
their legal, regulatory and best practice requirements,” and “develop[s] compliance tools, manage[s] 
stakeholder consultation and architect[s] solutions.” Services, GALEXIA, http://www.galexia.com/public 
/services/ [https://perma.cc/X4N5-J7EF]. 
160. The GDPR’s first stated goal is “protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data.” GDPR, supra note 9, art. 1, at 32; see also Assemb. B. 375, 2017-18 Reg. Sess., § 2 
(Cal. 2018) (finding that “[t]he unauthorized disclosure of personal information and the loss of privacy 
can have devastating effects for individuals” and “California consumers should be able to exercise 
control over their personal information, and they want to be certain that there are safeguards against 
misuse of their personal information”). 
161. Risk Management, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Risk-Ma 
nagement/rmf-overview [https://perma.cc/DZR5-FFYL]. 
162. See Journal of Data Protection and Privacy, HENRY STEWART PUBLICATIONS, https://www. 
henrystewartpublications.com/jdpp [https://perma.cc/2WZZ-7XG4] (“Essential reading for Presidents, 
CEOs, CTOs, CFOs, COOs and CIOs in private and public sectors, Government Departments and 
membership/trade bodies . . . .”). 
163. See Giulio Coraggio & Giulia Zappaterra, The Risk-Based Approach to Privacy: Risk or 
Protection for Business?, 1 J. DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 339 (2018). 











guidebooks do the same.164 But although PIAs are supposed to help 
companies “identif[y] and evaluate[] potential threats to individual privacy, 
discuss[] alternatives and identif[y] the appropriate risk mitigation measures 
for each,”165 a company merely looking to avoid risk to itself could see a 
PIA as a convenient paper trail documenting a check-the-box approach to 
privacy.166  
Law firms run risk minimization Continuing Legal Education programs 
that focus entirely on risks to the company.167 Privacy trade groups also 
frame compliance as a means of minimizing corporate risk. For example, 
the IAPP and TrustArc published a study focusing on prioritizing different 
parts of the GDPR based on the risks of noncompliance to the company.168 
And the organization has also framed data minimization as a way of 
reducing corporate risk,169 and hosted several webinars in which experts 
have said that the “heart” of data protection compliance is doing what “you 
can to manage the risk to the company” posed by new privacy laws.170 This 
focus ultimately encourages many companies to house their privacy officers 
within their risk management departments, and puts a decidedly corporate 
spin on privacy law itself.171 In other words, only collecting as much data as 
is necessary for a particular purpose does reduce the risk of litigation or 
investigation because data minimization is required by the GDPR. But the 
purpose of the requirement is to reduce privacy risks to consumers 
associated with the collection and processing of personal data.172 Skilled 
 
164. See, e.g., IT GOVERNANCE PRIVACY TEAM, EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
(GDPR): AN IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE GUIDE 14–58 (2d ed. 2017) (framing obligations in 
terms of risk management for the company); ARDI KOLAH, THE GDPR HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO 
IMPLEMENTING THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2018). 
165. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy Decision-
Making in US Government Agencies, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 225, 228 (David Wright & Paul 
De Hert eds., 2012). 
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privacy lawyers recognize this.173 Framed narrowly, however, data 
minimization means doing the least possible to shield a company from 
liability.  
I spoke with a small group of privacy professionals and corporate privacy 
lawyers about this at the IAPP’s “Privacy. Security. Risk.” conference in 
2017 and the Privacy+Security Forum in 2018. To their credit, each 
interviewee recognized that the GDPR and other risk-based approaches to 
privacy defined “risk” in terms of privacy risks to the individual consumer. 
But two additional themes came through. A deputy general counsel who had 
previously worked at an AmLaw Top 100 firm noted that “many of the 
privacy risk programs [he has] seen are more based on organizational risks, 
like the risk of a fine or lawsuits or the kind of reputational harm that comes 
with a data breach or having to testify before Congress.”174 A lawyer at a 
large international law firm agreed, noting that “for better or for worse, 
that’s what risk programs often turn into: the company is obviously 
interested in keeping itself out of the papers, and of course out of court.”175 
R. Jason Cronk, a certified privacy professional and privacy consultant, 
noted that companies assess risk based on “how big a footprint the company 
has and how big a target they are.”176 These and other professionals suggest 
that risk framing creates incentives to orient compliance programs around 
corporate risk avoidance rather than substantive adherence to the law much 
in the same way standardized testing can incent “teaching to the test” rather 
than holistic learning.177 
Framing the data privacy landscape as one based on corporate risk is not 
surprising. Risk framing can actually encourage compliance with the law by 
persuading executives to treat it as a high priority,178 especially since some 
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executives still see privacy as inconsistent with corporate profit goals. The 
risk of a fine of 4 percent of global revenue goes a long way to making 
privacy compliance a central corporate mission.179 Risk framing also makes 
sense from an endogenous political perspective. By emphasizing the 
dangers of noncompliance, privacy professionals stake out important 
territory at the highest levels of corporate decision-making, giving them 
seats at the table and the capacity to influence policy.180 And third-party 
vendors follow suit because it allows them to increase their market share 
and emphasize the importance of their services.181  
But risk framing is problematic if the goal is adherence to the substantive 
goals of privacy law. First, it is too narrow, focusing on the avoidance of a 
problem rather than the achievement of an affirmative goal—namely, 
greater user control, privacy, and safety. Second, it is incomplete. There is 
more to privacy than managing risk. Privacy also involves managing users’ 
expectations, their desire for obscurity,182 their need for trust,183 and their 
consistent distaste for transfers of data to third parties.184 Operating along 
narrow risk-mitigation paths distracts corporate attention from more 
important, substantive mandates. And, third, a risk-based approach is 
myopic. By enhancing user trust, privacy can be good for business,185 
especially if companies innovate and market around making privacy an 
essential aspect of their business model.  
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3. Symbols of Compliance 
Having interpreted privacy law for their corporate employers and framed 
corporate privacy obligations in terms of risk rather than substantive privacy 
protections for users, compliance professionals create structures, services, 
and technologies to comply with their version of the law.186 Some of these 
structures are tied to specific provisions of privacy law. For example, 
because the FTC often requires regulated companies to implement a 
“comprehensive privacy program”187 and because the GDPR requires the 
designation of a data protection officer (DPO),188 many companies have to 
hire a DPO. Similarly, because the GDPR gives consumers a right to access 
their information and a right to erase irrelevant, incorrect, and outdated 
information,189 data collectors have to develop systems to find and 
categorize user data. And laws like the California Online Privacy Protection 
Act (CalOPPA) require privacy notices that describe data use practices.190 
But where legal requirements are flexible—What is a CPO/DPO supposed 
to do? How do companies have to present their data use practices to users? 
How are companies supposed to design products with privacy in mind?—
compliance structures often become merely symbolic. 
Symbolic structures are those that carry with them an instant perception 
of legitimacy because they resemble pre-existing forms already having the 
imprimatur of the law. A nondiscrimination policy, with legal-sounding 
terms of art, or internal dispute resolution systems are examples of symbolic 
structures that resemble legal processes.191 As is the process of online 
content moderation, where rules reflect neoliberal First Amendment 
principles192 and questions are adjudicated with quasi-judicial 
proceedings.193 Notably, symbolic structures can be helpful. An equal 
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opportunity employment policy can have both expressive and substantive 
effects when companies take it seriously, and a fair dispute resolution 
system can give victims of discrimination an opportunity to make their 
voices heard and seek equal treatment.194 But when these structures become 
merely symbolic, when they offer just the veneer or the trappings of 
compliance with no substance, then they can frustrate the goals of the law. 
This is what is happening in privacy law. 
Over the last ten years, many companies have developed increasingly 
complex privacy structures, hired CPOs and downstream privacy 
professionals, and created protocols to manage access to personal data, 
among many other steps.195 In many companies, these structures are taken 
seriously and employees at all levels work with privacy offices to meet their 
responsibilities to their users. But these structures can also ossify into 
symbols. One of the best examples of this may be corporate privacy policies. 
Though privacy policies developed first as industry’s way to stave off 
regulation,196 they are now required by many state and federal mandates.197 
Many of those laws require that privacy policies be sufficiently 
“conspicuous” to users, and yet privacy policies today are a confusing mess 
of legalese jargon.198 No one reads them because they are long and difficult 
to understand. 199 And they are designed and presented to us in ways that 
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make them manipulative of our behavior.200 As such, they are merely 
symbolic structures: they technically comply with the law in that they are 
lists of data use practices, but they do not fulfill the law’s purpose of actually 
providing sufficient transparent notice to users to inform privacy decision-
making. 
Privacy compliance programs can also become merely symbolic when 
they are reduced to flow charts, check lists, and templates. Interviews with 
in-house lawyers and privacy professionals at three major U.S. technology 
companies reveal that checklists are frequent compliance tools because they 
“help people in their jobs simplify responsibilities and make sure they’re 
following the rules set down for them by the GC [general counsel] office, 
[the CPO,] or their manager.”201 Other scholars have found similar internal 
tools at work at other companies.202 Third-party technology vendors provide 
checklists and templates, as well. For example, Nymity offers an automated 
“privacy program . . . made up of policies, procedures, and other 
accountability mechanisms.”203 Data collectors snap up these tools with 
alacrity. 
These structures are not, by themselves, problematic. But extensive 
qualitative research at technology companies suggests that many of these 
policies are policies in name only. As one former engineer put it, “we would 
need to run our design by privacy, legal, and marketing.”204 But the process 
was “compliance-style. I remember being told by my manager that ‘privacy 
checked the boxes, so we can go ahead.’”205 And there was a sense among 
three interviewees that even though it was a privacy professional’s job to 
audit new designs, the privacy team did not really want to get in the way. 
“Nobody wants to stop creativity,” one former engineer at Google said.206 
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“I can’t say for sure, but I’m sure privacy didn’t want to, either. They didn’t 
stop us from doing our work.”207 This narrow, compliance focus reduced 
internal compliance rules into a merely symbolic structure.  
FTC-required assessments have also become merely symbolic structures 
that can impede the substantive implementation of privacy law. The FTC 
requires companies operating under consent decrees to submit assessments 
roughly every two years for the life of the order.208 Assessments have to be 
completed by a “qualified, objective, independent third-party” auditor with 
sufficient experience. And they must describe specific privacy controls, 
evaluate their adequacy given the size and scope of the company, explain 
how they meet FTC requirements, and certify they are operating 
effectively.209 That seems specific enough, without much opportunity for 
error. Assessments, like those required of Google210 and Facebook,211 are 
often the only real weapons in the FTC’s arsenal212 because they ostensibly 
require a qualified, independent third party to verify corporate compliance. 
And they have been heralded as game changers.213 
In reality, assessments have failed to achieve that goal because some of 
them have become mere symbols of compliance. The FTC requires 
assessments, and assessments are not the intense, independent, under-the-
hood investigations we think of when we think of audits. They leave wiggle 
room for regulated companies. Audits are independent third-party analyses, 
where the auditor herself reviews evidence and makes conclusions 
independent of the audit subject.214 Assessments are based on assertions 
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from management rather than wholly independent analyses from auditors, 
and are usually framed by goals set by management.215 That means that the 
company that is supposed to be the subject of the assessment is, in fact, 
determining the bases upon which it gets evaluated, thus giving companies 
some power to predetermine the results. For example, the FTC wanted an 
assessment to ensure that Google had a privacy team, an ongoing and 
flexible privacy assessment process, relationships with vendors capable of 
protecting data, and a few other related requirements.216 But based on a 
redacted version of the report, the assessment used conclusory language that 
was based almost entirely on Google proffers. For example, the report states 
that “Google has implemented a privacy risk assessment process in order to 
identify reasonably foreseeable, material risks, both internal and external,” 
tracking the language of the FTC order explicitly.217 As evidence for this 
conclusory statement, the report refers the reader to Google’s responses to 
the auditor’s questions, not any actual evidence.218 Later, the report 
concludes that “Google’s privacy controls were operating with sufficient 
effectiveness to provide reasonable assurance to protect the privacy of 
covered information” based only on “the Google Privacy Program set forth 
in Attachment A of Management’s Assertion in Exhibit I.”219 In other 
words, the only evidence showing that Google met FTC requirements was 
Google’s statements to that effect. The fact that these assessments can be 
fulfilled through rough conclusory statements without independent 
investigation shows how assessments can become mere symbols of 
compliance. 
4. Managerialization of Privacy Law 
Despite sometimes elevating mere form over substance, checklists, 
compliance templates, assessments, and other symbolic tools have diffused 
through the privacy ecosystem.220 Professionals share their experiences and 
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recommendations with each other through both formal and serendipitous 
interactions at workshops and conferences.221 I witnessed this first hand at 
the IAPP’s national conference and at smaller professional gatherings of 
privacy professionals, including the Privacy+Security Fora. This can be 
helpful; professionals can learn from each other, offer suggestions based on 
experiences, and improve their own protocols. The spread of these programs 
through social networks can also contribute to what organizational 
sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell have called “isomorphism,” 
or the tendency of companies in the same market to function, hire, and 
structure themselves in similar ways.222 That is why we see similar privacy 
compliance checklists and similar privacy organizational structures in many 
companies.  
Another consequence is that these structures—and their designers—
become the loci at which privacy law is negotiated, addressed, and 
implemented on a regular basis. When Edelman discussed the 
managerialization of antidiscrimination law, she noted that compliance 
professionals interpreting policies and running internal review processes 
had become the center of legal interpretation and implementation.223 What 
is happening in privacy law is similar. Even where in-house privacy 
professionals are doing their best, the tendency to managerialize compliance 
can shift the locus of privacy law to compliance professionals and engineers 
at privacy technology vendors, and shift the goal of compliance from 
substantive adherence to procedural box-checking.224 
Compliance professionals inside companies contribute to the 
managerialization of privacy law by talking about privacy in managerial 
terms. In the employment discrimination context, Edelman noticed that 
despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act specifically spoke to race and sex 
discrimination, compliance professionals on the ground tended to couch 
their work in terms of diversity, generally,225 and offered managerial (i.e., 
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profit), rather than social, justifications for increased diversity.226 This has 
the effect of incenting even those executives who care about racial and 
gender equality to think about diversity in more nebulous terms and through 
a corporate profit lens.227 Some privacy professionals and technology 
vendors228 are doing the same thing to privacy. They see privacy as one part 
of a compliance ecosystem focused on enhancing efficiency, speed, and 
productivity, while reducing the risk of debilitating fines. They see privacy 
structures in marketing terms: users are more likely to continue to share 
information with data collectors if users feel their privacy is protected.229 
The IAPP has hosted web conferences and published blogs focused on the 
efficiency and productivity benefits of privacy technology vendors.230 And 
although consumers can benefit when companies start thinking about 
privacy as good for business,231 the value proposition is nevertheless shifted 
from what helps consumers to what helps corporations.232 
When that happens, those responsible for compliance advance 
managerial, rather than substantive, privacy goals.233 Corporate goals like 
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on quantitative and qualitative research of management literature and executives and compliance 
professionals). 
226. See id. at 142–46 (showing how executives argued for greater diversity because it would 
increase profits and be good for business). 
227. Id. at 149–50; see also Lauren B. Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity 
Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1609–21 (2001); id. at 1621 
(“[D]iversity rhetoric subtly alters formal legal ideas of diversity by advocating diversity on a variety of 
dimensions that go well beyond those specified by civil rights law.”). This can have a negative effect on 
equality and civil rights. As Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita note, managerial models of “diversity” 
elevate categories of diversity—“geographic location, organizational rank, dress style, communication 
style, and attitudes”—as equally as important as race and gender, thus de-emphasizing the law’s focus 
on “discrimination, injustice, and historical disenfranchisement.” Id. at 1632. 
228. AuraPortal, for example, offers a GDPR compliance tool actually called “GDPR 
Accelerator” and markets the product as a way to “accelerate compliance in record time.” GDPR: 
Accelerate Compliance in Record Time, AURAPORTAL, https://www.auraportal.com/product/gdpr/ [http 
s://perma.cc/MF9U-3R4E]. 
229. See, e.g., Timothy Morey, Theodore “Theo” Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: 
Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2015, at 96, https://hbr.org/2015/05/cust 
omer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust [https://perma.cc/2SKT-XWHL]. 
230. See, e.g., Operationalizing Privacy Tech—A Privacy Pro’s Perspective, IAPP (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://iapp.org/store/webconferences/a0l1a000003gUuyAAE/ [https://perma.cc/AM9P-GPW 
A]. 
231. See ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: STRONG PRIVACY PROTECTION—NOW, AND 
WELL INTO THE FUTURE 18 (2011), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/PbDREport.p 
df [https://perma.cc/2NYF-LHVM]; see also Reidenberg, Restoring, supra note 196, at 771–
72 (“Privacy is a critical issue for the growth of electronic commerce. . . . The fair treatment of personal 
information and citizen confidence are each necessary conditions for electronic commerce over the next 
decade.”). 
232. See also COHEN, supra note 17, at 145 (discussing how managerializing internal dispute 
resolution tilts the scales away from individuals seeking to effectuate their privacy rights and toward 
corporate interests of efficiency and eliminating disruptions to innovation). 
233. In the employment discrimination context, Edelman described how human resources offices, 
internal dispute mechanisms, mandatory arbitration, and other structures that developed after the Civil 











efficiency, productivity, and profit are often thought to be in tension with 
the substantive legal goals of regulatory legislation, like equality, 
nondiscrimination, or, in this case, consumer privacy.234 Even though, as 
Julie Cohen and others have noted,235 there is no such conflict, corporate 
interests and their vendors on the ground are contributing to a narrative that 
regulation is antithetical to innovation and, more specifically, that consumer 
privacy rights have to take a back seat to corporate goals. Granted, there are 
many privacy professionals that are strong internal advocates for personal 
privacy and deep, substantive adherence to legal norms;236 however, merely 
symbolic structures are often being used to advance management goals to 
the detriment of consumers.  
5. Managerialization and the Perception of Compliance 
This happens because the use of managerial rhetoric around privacy and 
the proliferation of compliance structures influences the perception of 
adherence. That is, if we understand privacy law in managerial terms—as 
focused on managing corporate risk, balancing regulation and profit, and 
enhancing innovation—instead of protecting individuals, we tend to see 
merely symbolic structures developed in line with those terms as 
constituting compliance with the law. They get so engrained in our legal 
 
Rights Act contributed to the “managerialization” of civil rights law, or where structures become the 
setting for advancing managerial goals rather than the substantive legal goals the legislation intended. 
See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 124–25. 
234. See, e.g., Balancing Privacy and Innovation: Does the President’s Proposal Tip the Scale?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
112th Cong. 11 (2012) (statement of Rep. Marsha Blackburn, Member, H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce) (“And what happens when you follow the European privacy model and take information 
out of the information economy? . . . [R]evenues fall, innovation stalls, and you lose out to innovators 
who chose to work elsewhere.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA 
OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 7, 15, 26–28 (2012), htt 
ps://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-con 
sumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZL4-P 
PPC] (noting the comments from industry that privacy regulation would increase costs and decrease 
profits). 
235. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 29–
30 (2019); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1919–20 (2013) (noting that 
the “simplistic” view of privacy as antithetical to innovation and profit “fails to take into account either 
the nature of innovative practice or the dynamic function of privacy”); see also Katherine J. Strandburg 
& Yafit Lev-Aretz, Better Together: Privacy Regulation and Innovation Policy (forthcoming 2019) 
(demonstrating that little evidence exists for the argument that privacy regulation will stifle technology 
innovation). 
236. The IAPP recognizes that persuading executives to take action on privacy is one of a CPO’s 
top priorities. See Michael Spadea, Getting Your Board on Board, Part II, IAPP (Sept. 1, 2012), https://ia 
pp.org/news/a/getting-your-board-on-board-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/S8LW-3QTA]; Chris Pahl, 













consciousness237 that, over time, no one bothers to look under the hood and 
see the hollow shell inside.238 The effect is the frustration of consumer 
privacy rights because users assume the law cannot help them. 
This is already happening in privacy law. Joe Turow has shown that we 
assume websites with privacy policies actually protect our privacy,239 even 
though a privacy policy is merely a statement of data use practices rather 
than a promise of confidentiality.240 And Woodrow Hartzog has argued that 
users and policymakers too often confuse structures of user control over 
privacy—consent buttons, left-to-right toggles, cookie consents, and even 
opt-in buttons, to name a few—with actual user empowerment and 
privacy.241 The problem, as Hartzog insightfully notes, is that “control 
doesn’t scale. The sheer number of choices that inundate users under a 
control regime is overwhelming to the point of futility.”242 Choice, though 
technically required by even supposedly strict laws like the GDPR, becomes 
an easy tactic for shifting the burden of privacy management from the 
technology company, which is actually well-situated to address privacy 
issues efficiently, to the user, who is not.243 No wonder Facebook CEO 
 
237. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 154–55 (arguing that in the employment discrimination 
context, the managerialization of civil rights law encouraged many social groups—from employees to 
judges—to perceive the mere presence of an anti-discrimination policy, for example, as proof that the 
company was following Title VII). 
238. John Meyer and Brian Rowan called this the “rationalized myth” of formal structures. John 
W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 
AM. J. SOC. 340, 343 (1977). 
239. See Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, Persistent Misperceptions: 
Americans’ Misplaced Confidence in Privacy Policies, 2003-2015, at 62 J. BROADCASTING & 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 461, 463 (2018) (finding that more than half of Americans surveyed believe that a 
company with a privacy policy does not share customer information with anyone); see also Aaron Smith, 
What Internet Users Know About Technology and the Web, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2014/11/PI_Web-IQ_112514_PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
UMX3-HEW7] (making similar findings across age and educational groups). 
240. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 155 (using the phrase “managerialization of legal 
consciousness” to describe when individuals tend to see the presence of symbolic structures as not 
merely tools to achieve compliance but as actually achieving substantive legal goals). 
241. See HARTZOG, supra note 71, at 62–63. 
242. Id. at 64. Too many choices lead to consumer exhaustion or choice nihilism. There is a long 
consumer behavior literature on overchoice. See, e.g., Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When 
Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 995, 997–1004 (2000) (using field and laboratory experiments showing consumers are more 
likely to make purchases given smaller sets of choices); Benjamin Scheibehenne, Rainer Greifeneder 
& Peter M. Todd, Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload, 
37 J. CONSUMER RES. 409 (2010) (reviewing the literature on overchoice); Barry Schwartz & Andrew 
Ward, Doing Better but Feeling Worse: The Paradox of Choice, in POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACTICE 
86, 86–88 (P. Alex Linley & Stephen Joseph eds., 2004) (too much choice has negative consequences). 
For a discussion of how overchoice and other cognitive barriers prevent individuals from effectuating 
their real privacy preferences, see Ari Ezra Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy 
Paradox,” 31 CURRENT ISSUES PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=3456155. 
243. This argument parallels a thesis in tort law known as the least, or cheapest, cost avoider, 
which posits that, as between two parties involved in an accident, the one more capable of efficiently 











Mark Zuckerberg talked about giving users more choices and more control 
fifty-three times during his 2018 testimony before the United States 
Senate.244  
We live in a legal environment in which privacy rights mobilization is 
already difficult; managerial privacy compliance exacerbates the problem. 
Standing requirements245 and other hurdles hamper privacy plaintiffs’ use 
of tort law,246 contract law,247 and federal privacy statutes248 to vindicate 
their privacy rights. Even the FTC’s power to force a company to overhaul 
its approach to privacy and security is under scrutiny.249 Current law’s 
consent paradigm imposes minimal obligations on technology companies 
while giving them ample opportunity to manipulate consumers by design.250 
And most users are dissuaded from even learning about their privacy rights 
because so many corporate executives and self-styled experts say that 
 
addressing the risk involved should be responsible. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for 
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of Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO, Facebook, Inc.). 
245. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1541–42 (2016) (requiring data breach plaintiffs 
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Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 440 (2017) (noting that Spokeo “seems to be serving 
no purpose other than to constitutionalize a deregulatory agenda”). 
246. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting 
an intrusion upon seclusion claim against American Express for renting purchase histories because 
plaintiffs were “voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants”). But see Scott Skinner-
Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2018) (showing how plaintiffs 
of privilege fair better in privacy tort claims and arguing for a reinvigoration of privacy tort law to protect 
the privacy rights of marginalized populations). 
247. See, e.g., In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (rejecting a contract claim against JetBlue for disclosing customer information to third parties in 
contravention of its privacy policy because plaintiffs failed to identify and plead any damages). But see 
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. 
L. REV. 737, 755 (2018) (arguing that courts should consider intangible, but no less serious, harms when 
considering invasion of privacy claims and failing to do so runs afoul of the common law). 
248. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting 
summary judgment to defendant Pharmatrak on claims that it violated the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite intent). 
249. See, e.g., LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
an FTC consent order requiring a company to overhaul its security practices to meet a general standard 
of “reasonableness” is unenforceable for vagueness). 
250. See HARTZOG, supra note 71, at 21–54 (describing how technologies are designed to 
manipulate users into giving their data to tech companies); see id. at 62–67 (showing how companies 
extract consent from users by relying on confusion and exhaustion); see also Ryan Calo, Digital Market 
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1005–06 (2014) (discussing the manipulative work of “dark 
patterns” and noting that “[e]ven general knowledge of consumer psychology, coupled with clever 
design, can lead to abuse”); Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 













privacy is dead.251 But by focusing on compliance paper trails, 
managerialization of privacy law makes vindicating privacy rights even 
harder. Eleven of thirteen privacy compliance professionals I interviewed 
agreed with the assessment from a risk and compliance executive in New 
York that “we document everything so we have a log when someone comes 
after us.”252 Many privacy technology vendors also see compliance records 
as a means of protecting the company against consumer lawsuits or 
government investigations, as demonstrated by how many market 
themselves as helping clients achieve GDPR compliance by preparing for 
audits.253 Demonstrations of these products and their market positioning 
suggest that the products are almost entirely focused on “reducing the cost, 
time and effort required to prepare for audits.”254 Even the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) of the United Kingdom fell into this line of 
thinking. In its Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
the ICO counseled companies to document processing activities to “help 
[them] demonstrate [their] compliance with other aspects of the GDPR.”255 
When a company can claim that it should not be held responsible for data 
misuse because, despite privacy problems in a final product, they completed 
a privacy impact assessment and documented internal approaches to privacy 
issues, individuals and regulators are both immediately put on the defensive 
and may be dissuaded from mobilizing their rights and investigative powers 
in the first place.256 Granted, the GDPR includes documentation 
requirements;257 companies need reports to prove they took “reasonable and 
appropriate” steps to protect consumer privacy under FTC consent 
 
251. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Four Words Going Bye-Bye, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2014), 
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with author).  
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(GDPR) 98 (Mar. 22, 2018), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/guide-to-the-general-data-prote 
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257. See GDPR, supra note 9, art. 30, ¶ 1, at 50–51. 











decrees.258 But the way some market players conflate the structure of 
compliance (the records) with actual compliance (following the GDPR) is 
striking.  
The focus on documentation as an end in itself elevates a merely 
symbolic structure to evidence of actual compliance with the law, obscuring 
the substance of consumer privacy law and discouraging both users and 
policymakers from taking more robust actions. Paul Butler made a similar 
argument about the effect of Gideon v. Wainwright259 on the incarceration 
of poor persons of color.260 By focusing on a process right—the right to 
counsel—Gideon, Butler argues, obscured the “real crisis of indigent 
defense” that prison is designed for poor people and not rich ones.261 
Ensuring some adequate representation “invests the criminal justice system 
with a veneer” of legitimacy, impartiality, and protection for ordinary 
persons, discouraging anyone from digging any deeper.262 Butler concluded 
that “[o]n its face, the grant that Gideon provides poor people seems more 
than symbolic: it requires states to pay for poor people to have lawyers. But 
the implementation of Gideon suggests that the difference between 
symbolic and material rights might be more apparent than real.”263 The same 
thing is happening in privacy law. Privacy professionals’ and third-party 
vendors’ focus on records and documentation offers a convenient veneer of 
legitimacy to a process of technology design, data use, and information flow 
that remains unaltered and harmful to consumers. 
Risk framing also tilts the scales against consumers. When compliance 
professionals focus on managing corporate risk under privacy laws, they 
focus on what is good for them, not what the law requires in substance. Like 
the management lawyers in Edelman’s research, many of whom 
recommended creating symbolic structures to make employers appear like 
they were doing their best to improve workplace equality,264 some privacy 
 
258. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 10, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PGR (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012), 
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2176 (2013). 
261. Id. at 2178. 
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professionals see compliance as convenient ways to stave off investigations, 
audits, and legal challenges. Within a risk narrative, that positioning serves 
to discourage rights mobilization and regulatory inquiry.265  
6. Deference to Symbols in Privacy Law 
The legal endogeneity narrative reaches its climax when, after becoming 
part of our collective legal consciousness, merely symbolic structures are 
leveraged by lawyers, judges, and regulators as actual evidence of 
adherence to the law.266 There are three steps in this process: “reference, 
relevance, and deference.”267 Reference occurs where judges merely refer 
to symbolic structures in their decisions. Relevance involves a judge noting 
or ruling that having a structure, like an internal dispute resolution process, 
is relevant to whether a company complied with a law like Title VII.268 And 
deference, the final stage, occurs when judges see the mere presence of a 
compliance structure as dispositive.269 In the employment discrimination 
context, Edelman found evidence of deference to merely symbolic 
structures littered throughout the law. Management attorneys listed them in 
their defense briefs, judges referred to them and pointed to them as evidence 
of compliance, and even plaintiffs’ lawyers adopted them as goals for 
injunctive relief.270 In the privacy space, it remains difficult to assess legal 
endogeneity just yet because a new privacy law landscape is still 
unfolding.271 But the process is indeed ongoing. 
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202019%20Bill%20Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9AD-56MC]. Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), along 
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Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has enforced a largely self-regulatory 
privacy regime,272 which has allowed industry to set the terms of the debate. 
Almost all of what Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have called the 
“common law of privacy”—the decades of FTC consent decrees—are 
actually settlement agreements with regulated entities.273 That means that 
the law regulating technology companies is, in part, dictated by the 
companies themselves. The FTC also defers to industry practices in the area 
of data security.274 Companies will often promise that customer information 
is encrypted,275 secured,276 or adequately protected.277 But when there is a 
data breach, the FTC relies on the customary practices of industry to set a 
baseline for what a company should have done in the first place. In United 
States v. ValueClick, for example, the FTC alleged that ValueClick “did not 
encrypt sensitive information consistent with industry standards.”278 And in 
In re Eli Lilly & Co., the FTC alleged that the company failed to use the 
“industry standard secure socket layer encryption.”279 Industry custom has 
long been a yardstick by which the common law measured reasonable 
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complaints alleging violations of COPPA, GLBA, and the Safe Harbor Agreement, the final disposition 
of the matter is a settlement, default judgment, or abandonment of the action by the FTC in the 
investigatory stage.”); see also COHEN, supra note 17, at 188 (noting that consent decrees bring in private 
power to government decisions). 
274. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 636. 
275. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 43, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Rennert, No. CV-S-00-0861-JBR (D. Nev. July 12, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/f 
iles/documents/cases/2000/07/ftc.gov-iogcomp.htm [https://perma.cc/XNB5-E332]. 
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care.280 But even customs have to be reasonable,281 suggesting a two-step 
reasonable care analysis. By starting with a heuristic set by industry, the 
analysis becomes endogenous, giving companies the opportunity to set a 
presumption that needs to be refuted, rather than the other way around. And 
even if we accept the relevance of industry custom in the FTC’s privacy 
“common law,” the prevalence of industry standards still speaks to the way 
regulated entities set the baseline on which they will be judged. 
The FTC also defers to other industry structures of symbolic compliance. 
After the organization TRUSTe, now TrustArc, started issuing privacy 
“seals” certifying that a website’s privacy policy met certain standards and 
norms, the FTC incorporated those seals as evidence of compliance.282 In 
FTC v. Toysmart.com,283 for example, the FTC noted that Toysmart had 
become “a licensee of . . . an organization that certifies the privacy policies 
of online businesses and allows such businesses to display a . . . trustmark 
or seal.”284 In so doing, the FTC was referring to a structure a third party 
had developed on its own, thus pushing TRUSTe’s seals into the legal 
consciousness. As Solove and Hartzog note, this pushed more websites to 
create privacy policies.285 
And despite their hype, the FTC’s privacy assessments defer to corporate 
compliance structures all the time. Because assessments are based on 
attestations from corporate officers rather than independent investigation, 
Facebook was able to lie routinely to the FTC during its initial and biennial 
assessment reports required under the 2011 Consent Decree.286 And the 
FTC’s latest settlement with the company offers more of the same in this 
respect. Rather than empowering a strong independent auditor, the 
 
280. See, e.g., Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505 (N.Y. 1982) (“[W]hen proof of an accepted 
practice is accompanied by evidence that the defendant conformed to it, this may establish due 
care . . . .”); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 1947) (“it may be that the 
custom” in New York Harbor was to not have bargees aboard their boats and if so, that “custom should 
control”); see also Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942) (evidence 
of custom is helpful because popular customs call into question plaintiff arguments about the feasibility 
of a different approach and highlight the place of the customary practice in society).  
281. See Trimarco, 436 N.E.2d at 506 (noting that industry custom can only set the standard of 
due care if the industry custom is itself reasonable). 
282. The FTC did sue TRUSTe for failing to “conduct annual recertifications for all companies 
holding TRUSTe Certified Privacy Seals” despite promises to the contrary. See Complaint at 4, In re 
True Ultimate Standards Everywhere, Inc, No. 1323219 (F.T.C. Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sys 
tem/files/documents/cases/141117trustecmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9N6-CJ5U]. 
283. First Amended Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass. July 21, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/cases/toysmartcomplaint.htm [https://perma.cc/32CZ-ELQK]. 
284. Id. ¶ 8. 
285. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 593. 
286. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief ¶¶ 12, 124, 181, United States 
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
cases/182_3109_facebook_complaint_filed_7-24-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/84LK-6Y35]. 











settlement permits assessments to be based entirely on documents Facebook 
provides to the assessor.287 That means that Facebook will set the terms for 
its own evaluation, with assessors never looking under the hood.288 
The GDPR also incorporates industry structures. Recognizing the 
importance of an internal advocate for privacy, the GDPR requires 
companies to hire a data protection officer and involve her “in all issues 
which relate to the protection of personal data.”289 Article 35 also requires 
companies to complete data protection impact assessments (DPIAs) before 
processing data.290 Both of these elements are undoubtedly important. But a 
data protection office is a structure that could become merely symbolic if, 
as research has shown, the office is marginalized, unsupported, and 
disconnected from the process of technology design.291 And DPIAs can 
become simple paper trails when seen as ends in themselves rather than as 
a substantive guide for helping a company determine if it should go ahead 
with or abort its planned data use. Companies can, therefore, take advantage 
of the delays and complexities in judicial decision-making to decide for 
themselves what the GDPR requires in practice.292 
In the end, these seemingly small beachheads of symbolic structures in 
the law are nevertheless worrisome because they may have an anchoring 
effect on judges and regulators. Anchoring is a cognitive bias in which one 
relies too heavily on an initial piece of information when making 
decisions.293 In this context, a symbolic structure like a seal or a CPO office 
could anchor an impression, later made official in a judicial decision or 
 
287. See Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief, United 
States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu 
ments/cases/182_3109_facebook_order_filed_7-24-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QRJ-9KGF] [hereinafter 
Facebook Stipulated Order]. 
288. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 191 (noting that standards for what is and what is not acceptable 
tend to develop among auditors, particularly when their work is based on corporate-defined “best 
practices,” leaving the details undiscovered). 
289. See GDPR, supra note 9, art. 38, at 55–56. 
290. See id. art. 35, at 53. 
291. See Waldman, supra note 24 (showing that the pro-privacy ethos of privacy professionals 
inside corporations was not being fully realized because forces both exogenous and endogenous to the 
company created a disconnect between privacy professionals and engineers). 
292. Europe has tried to stop companies from undermining the GDPR by having the Data 
Protection Board (DPB), formerly the Article 29 Working Party, and national data privacy authorities 
issue opinion and guidance documents that detail what does and does not comply with the GDPR. As 
Margot Kaminski has deftly studied, the DPB’s interpretations are essential to properly construing the 
GDPR’s requirements. See Kaminski, supra note 118. However, as noted earlier, the Board’s guidance 
is still vague and there are still wide gaps in its coverage, thus allowing corporate actors to step in. See 
supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
293. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and 
Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 387, 387–88 (1996) (discussing the traditional 













regulatory order, that a company is compliant with the law, even if the seal 
is meaningless or the CPO’s office cannot influence design or data use.  
C. The Sociopolitical Narrative of Symbolic Privacy Compliance 
Undoubtedly, many of the privacy compliance structures developed at 
companies do constrain abusive data use practices. They serve as guardrails 
and set the tone for what data use practices are appropriate. But the trend 
toward compliance in name only, while not universal, is unmistakable. And 
we should be wary of these developments. Legal endogeneity threatens the 
rule of law by undermining the ability of social legislation to achieve its 
goals.294 Faced with laws passed to give consumers more privacy 
protections, on the one hand, and a business model driven by the collection 
of consumer data, on the other, technology companies reorient regulatory 
legislation in ways that minimize disruption to profits regardless of what 
that does to privacy, shaping the contours and the meaning of the law as we 
know it. The merely symbolic structures companies create give them yet 
another chance—after intense lobbying295 and actually drafting new 
legislation themselves296—to water down regulatory requirements they find 
onerous. Endogeneity, therefore, shifts the locus of power from 
policymakers to corporate actors, allowing companies to transform 
regulations aimed at curbing their excesses into pathways that actually serve 
their interests.  
By shifting the locus at which privacy law is negotiated from 
policymakers to corporations, we also change the discourse of power. The 
language we use shapes our understanding and perceptions of legitimacy, 
reality, and legality.297 As Foucault argued, “discourse transmits and 
produces power.”298 Critical race theorists have made similar arguments 
 
294. See EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 216. 
295. See Lobbying: Top Spenders, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.or 
g/lobby/top.php?indexType=s [https://perma.cc/AYL4-R3KS]. 
296. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 906 (2013); see also Nourse & Schacter, supra note 90, at 575. 
297. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the 
Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988) (noting a change in how we talk about confessions 
and arguing that power has shifted alongside). 
298. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) 
(arguing that the medical and psychiatric disciplines’ use of the rhetoric of “normal” and “abnormal” 
sexual desire to distinguish opposite-sex from same-sex attraction gave power and legitimacy to 
heteronormative thinking, institutions, and constituencies); see also Gerald Turkel, Michel Foucault: 
Law, Power, and Knowledge, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 170, 172 (1990) (describing Foucault’s argument on 
“discourses of domination”). 











about the power of speech.299 As have feminist scholars.300 Our social 
understanding of privacy is written and discussed in a variety of ways, 
sometimes conflicting, overlapping, and cacophonous.301 But through the 
noise, the discourse is accessible to consumers: it’s “creepy” when Alexa 
listens to everything we say,302 “anonymity” protects people from the effects 
of revelation,303 we want more “control” over our information,304 and we 
“trust” our friends to keep our secrets.305 In a world where compliance 
professionals determine what the law requires and create symbolic 
compliance tools, the discourse of law becomes the discourse of 
compliance, paper trails, and checklists. This disempowers consumers, who 
have no access to this privacy discourse, and again serves to undermine the 
promise of privacy law as consumer protection. 
More troubling is why this is happening. If, as I have endeavored to 
show, legal endogeneity is a problem for privacy law, it is not a surprising 
one. It is, I argue, the natural byproduct of our neoliberal managerial system, 
one that prizes and valorizes efficiency and deregulated markets over 
consumer welfare.  
Neoliberalism represents resistance to a political system oriented around 
social values, solidarity, and welfare and replaces it with one dedicated to 
individualism as a paramount social value. Its proponents argue that 
individual human well-being is best “advanced by the maximization of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized 
by[, among other things,] private property rights, individual liberty, [and] 
 
299. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444 (“[R]acist speech constructs the social reality that constrains the 
liberty of non-whites because of their race.”); see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 
AND RIGHTS 61 (1991) (we live with the legacy of slavery in part through “powerful and invisibly 
reinforcing structures of thought, language, and law”). 
300. See, e.g., MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1996) (using real world examples of female lawyers to argue that Foucault’s discourse of 
power is fundamentally a gendered dynamic). 
301. See SOLOVE, supra note 114, at 14–36 (reviewing some of the many different definitions of 
privacy); see WALDMAN, supra note 114, at 13–45 (grouping seemingly conflicting visions of privacy 
into negative and positive conceptions). 
302. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social 
Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 61–71 (2013) (describing situations where technologies functioned in 
ways users found “creepy”). 
303. This is particularly helpful for members of marginalized and stigmatized communities. See, 
e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015) (arguing that privacy 
should be understood as preventing intimate information from serving as the basis of discrimination). 
304. See INNESS, supra note 114, at 56 (privacy is “control over a realm of intimacy”); WESTIN, 
supra note 114, at 7 (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”); 
Matthews, supra note 114, at 351 (privacy is making the choice to “control” and “manage” the boundary 
between ourselves and others). 
305. See WALDMAN, supra note 114, at 51–52 (noting that trust allows us to share because it 












unencumbered markets.”306 Julie Cohen argues that law has facilitated 
remaking of society around neoliberal political economy.307 For example, 
law defines property rights, limits oversight, grants legal immunity to 
corporations, creates self-regulatory regimes, and so forth. For privacy, this 
manifests itself when regulators rely on industry to make policy, as when 
corporate “best practices” are accepted without interrogation or assessments 
are taken at face value without independent investigation.308 Often, this 
orientation results in what Jodi Short has called the “paranoid style” of 
governance,309 or an overly modest approach based on exaggerated worries 
about state power and insufficient sensitivity to private power.  
This is precisely what we see happening in privacy law. The FTC’s 
humble regulatory posture, including its settlement practice, its inability to 
impose administrative fines, and its deferential stance on corporate 
assessments, just to name a few, stem from a neoliberal ethos that prioritizes 
deregulated markets and corporate innovation over human welfare. Even if 
the FTC wanted to perform more robust oversight, it has been hemmed in 
by Congressionally-imposed limitations on its authority, limitations that 
also stem from a neoliberal bent toward public regulation.310 Europe has 
tried a different approach, with more active regulators and a more involved 
government. But no matter how aggressive European data protection 
authorities become, the relatively permissive approach in the United States, 
the primary home of the largest technology companies, will continue to 
hinder the European goal of protecting the fundamental right to data 
privacy. 
In addition to formal legal institutions, law is institutionalizing 
neoliberalism through the ground-up “self-interested efforts of information-
economy participants and the lawyers and lobbyists they employ.”311 Those 
efforts, examples of which are described throughout this Article, are geared 
toward protecting corporate power, minimizing the disruptive effects of 
regulation, reducing the risk of litigation, and increasing the efficiency and 
independence of the means of production. Julie Cohen describes those 
efforts as managerial. Managerial institutions are those that translate 
neoliberal ideology into an organizational system focused on deploying 
informational, structural, and technological tools to make themselves more 
 
306. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 7 (quoting David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative 
Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 22 (2007)). 
307. See id. at 8–9. 
308. See supra Part II.B.6; see also Gray, supra note 215. 
309. Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635 (2012), 
quoted in COHEN, supra note 17, at 187. 
310. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 14, at 65, 166. 
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efficient.312 A managerial approach uses legal structures and discourse to 
privilege corporate efficiency and independence from government.313 As a 
result, it undermines regulatory legislation from within, facilitating the 
creation of merely symbolic compliance structures. In the privacy space, the 
managerial ethos encourages in-house attorneys and privacy professionals 
to interpret legal obligations in line with corporate, rather than consumer, 
goals: the managerial question is “how can we prove compliance with the 
least disruption and risk to production?” instead of “how can we proceed 
while creating fewer privacy risks for our consumers?”314 Companies also 
leverage paper trails to document their technical compliance with the law 
rather than using them to enhance substantive privacy protection for 
consumers through privacy-enhancing design.315 Companies are even 
starting to outsource their privacy compliance functions to technology 
vendors.316 This shifts a significant cost center, but it narrows privacy to 
what can be coded into software, thus impeding consumer privacy rights 
and frustrating the goals of privacy legislation. And yet, as discussed above, 
these procedures can serve as evidence of compliance even if they are 
substantively impotent.  
Without evidence, industry also deploys the neoliberal discourse of 
deregulation and innovation to push back against what it sees as 
burdensome regulation.317 For example, during a June 2019 hearing on New 
York State’s proposed privacy bill, four representatives from industry—Ted 
Potrikus, the President and CEO of the Retail Council of New York State; 
Christina Fisher, Executive Director for Massachusetts and the Northeast of 
TechNet; Zachary Hecht, Policy Director for TechNYC; and John Olsen, 
Director of the Northeast Region of the Internet Association—referred to 
dangers of privacy laws stifling innovation twenty-seven times in one 
hour.318 Google, Facebook, Amazon, and the American Chamber of 
 
312. Id. at 143–45. 
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314. See supra Part II.B.2. 
315. See supra Part II.B.2–II.B.5. 
316. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Outsourcing Privacy (under submission) (manuscript on file with 
author). The IAPP’s 2017 Privacy Tech Vendor Report included fifty-one vendors. The 2018 version 
includes 192, showing significant expansion of the market. See IAPP, 2017 PRIVACY TECH VENDOR 
REPORT (2017), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Tech-Vendor-Directory-1.4.1-electronic.p 
df [https://perma.cc/QKN6-7VRV]; IAPP, 2018 PRIVACY TECH VENDOR REPORT 16 (2018), https://iap 
p.org/media/pdf/resource_center/2018-Privacy-Tech-Vendor-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEY4-7CK 
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318. See Joint Public Hearing: To Conduct Discussion on Online Privacy and What Role the State 
Legislature Should Play in Overseeing It: Joint Public Hearing Before the S. Standing Comm. on 














Commerce lobbied the European Union to weaken the GDPR in the name 
of innovation.319 The Technology Policy Institute, a think tank almost 
entirely funded by large technology corporations, concluded that “there is 
no evidence . . . that use of big data for commercial and other non-
surveillance purposes has caused privacy harms” and warned against 
innovation-stifling regulation.320 And the discourse has made its way into 
official government documents. In 2010, the Department of Commerce 
published a paper that presumed privacy and innovation were in tension, 
using variations of the word “innovation” seventy-six times in seventy-eight 
pages.321 Concerns about how privacy could disrupt innovation also figured 
prominently in the FTC’s 2012 report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an 
Era of Rapid Change,322 and in two reports from the Obama Administration 
in 2012323 and 2014.324 
Neoliberal managerialism and discourse, therefore, contribute to the 
endogeneity of privacy law by simultaneously weakening government’s 
oversight posture and strengthening industry’s ability to frame legal 
requirements in ways that serve their data-hungry business models. 
Together they create a political environment that prioritizes efficiency and 
demonizes regulation while imbuing the legal consciousness of corporate 
actors with the notion that leveraging merely symbolic structures is morally, 
politically, and even legally acceptable. 
That might suggest that the legal endogeneity narrative described in this 
Article is more a systemic problem with today’s political economy and 
compliance culture rather than a problem unique to privacy. That is both 
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right and wrong. Though focusing on employment discrimination and the 
merely symbolic structures erected to comply with Title VII, Edelman 
suggested that some of the blame lay with “compliance professionals” who, 
in part because of “their professional training and roles,”325 will frame the 
law in managerial ways. She also noted that because of “the growing 
compliance industry that markets its services, the risk framing [contributing 
to legal endogeneity] continues well after employers come to see the legal 
environment as a threat.”326 These problems are inherent to the compliance 
industry as a whole, not just in the privacy compliance space.  
That said, seeing legal endogeneity as simply a general compliance 
problem misses the point. It is indeed a compliance problem, but one that is 
both new to privacy and uniquely detrimental to realizing the promises of 
law in information domains like privacy. Legal endogeneity has thrived in 
an era in which both industry and government have been informationalized. 
Where traditional legal regimes have either been slow to catch up or remain 
structurally incompatible with information-based systems, companies have 
rushed in to fill the void with internal structures that have the veneer of 
legality but serve their own interests. And judges are attracted to them as 
convenient, heuristic ways to (inadequately) apply familiar concepts to new 
problems.327 And privacy, unlike employment discrimination, is steeped in 
technology, some of which is far beyond the casual expertise of judges, 
lawyers, and juries. When confusion abounds and regulated entities are 
assumed to be experts,328 the exogenous legal system sees itself less 
competent to intercede and decide difficult questions for itself.329 It becomes 
even more humble, even more “paranoid,” and leaves corporate actors to 
act with even more impunity. Given the terabytes of data these companies 
collect and the manipulations possible from analyzing that data, that kind of 
unregulated freedom is uniquely dangerous. 
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III. RECLAIMING PRIVACY LAW’S PROMISE 
So far, in constructing a legal endogeneity narrative in privacy law, I 
have argued that ambiguity and paper trail-based safe harbors in data 
protection law have given those on the ground the opportunity to frame legal 
requirements in ways that advance corporate, rather than consumer, 
interests.330 This can have the effect of elevating form over substance, 
catalyzing the development of compliance structures that, on their face, 
seem to comply with the law, but, as mere symbols of compliance, actually 
frustrate the legislative goal of protecting the privacy of data subjects.331 
The last part of the legal endogeneity cycle occurs when mere symbols of 
compliance are given the official imprimatur by the law, or when symbolic 
structures fill the void left by the ambiguous laws that gave rise to them in 
the first place.332 Evidence of judicial and regulatory deference to symbolic 
structures is already spreading throughout privacy law.333 And that is putting 
privacy protection and the rule of law at risk.334 Taking action now may still 
allow us to reverse course.  
There is probably no single quick fix, no single way of writing a 
comprehensive privacy law that would always prevent managerialization 
and legal endogeneity, especially since neoliberalism fosters an 
environment that contributes to legal endogeneity. But that does not mean 
we have no recourse. We can try to stop the worst of legal endogeneity 
during its six-stage process.335 Elsewhere, I have discussed some legal and 
structural changes necessary to encourage engineers to respect robust 
conceptions of privacy and to integrate privacy into every corner of a 
corporation’s ethos, practice, and routine.336 Similarly, changes in the 
exogenous legal context in which technology companies operate may be 
able to rewrite the inchoate legal endogeneity narrative I have so far 
described. 
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A. Law Reform 
The law contributes to the spread of merely symbolic structures by 
leaving it up to compliance professionals to interpret the meaning of vague 
statutes. It also incorporates discourse and processes that lend themselves to 
check-box compliance, managerialization, and the erosion of consumer 
values in favor of corporate ones. In both systematic and specific ways, the 
law can do better. 
We need to move away from process-oriented, check-box visions of 
privacy law that are susceptible to symbolic structures. Fortunately, we have 
other options. Woodrow Hartzog has called for leveraging contract, tort, and 
consumer protection law to regulate the design of new technologies.337 
Elsewhere, I argued for leveraging lessons from the law of products liability 
for design defects to create an accountability regime for companies that 
design technologies with insufficient designed-in privacy protections.338 A 
products liability regime is less susceptible to legal endogeneity than 
compliance-based approaches because of the powerful role litigation and 
courts can play in influencing design across an entire industry.  
In addition, Jonathan Zittrain, Jack Balkin, Daniel Solove, Danielle 
Citron, and I have argued that data collectors should be treated as fiduciaries 
of our information and, therefore, subject to similar duties of care, loyalty, 
and confidentiality that characterize our relationships to doctors, lawyers, 
and trustees.339 Duties of care would require companies that collect and 
process our information to take reasonable steps to secure personal data 
from unauthorized access. With “reasonable” defined according to 
traditional common law principles,340 companies would have to do more 
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than copy the symbolic structures created throughout their industry. They 
would have to ensure that those structures provide sufficient security to 
meet the legal standard of reasonableness.341 Duties of loyalty mean that a 
company cannot use our data in ways that would foreseeably cause harm or 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable user. Playing with our 
emotions,342 manipulating elections,343 and listening in on our personal 
conversations,344 for example, would be off limits. And duties of 
confidentiality would ensure that a company does not share any of our data 
with a third party unless those third parties agree to fulfill the same duties 
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality. A bill proposed at the end of the 115th 
Congress by Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii reflected some of these 
ideas.345 This is not to say that these proposals, if adopted, could never be 
undermined by merely symbolic structures. A first step, though, is to orient 
privacy law toward well-worn standards that have the clarity of centuries of 
common law behind them yet cannot easily be reduced to simple and 
underinclusive code. 
B. Rule-Making and Guidance 
European governments are trying to protect the integrity of the GDPR by 
cutting off the opportunity for corporations to determine for themselves 
what the GDPR requires. The European Data Protection Board, along with 
the privacy authorities of member states, are issuing guidance documents to 
spell out GDPR mandates in more detail. The UK ICO, for example, has 
issued guidance documents that give specific examples of the types of 
designs that meet GDPR legal standards.346 And to meet the consent 
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requirements of Article 7, the agency advises that “affirmative opt-in 
methods might include signing a consent statement, oral confirmation, a 
binary choice presented with equal prominence, or switching technical 
settings away from the default.”347  
The United States lacks a similar resource for specificity.348 This is why 
the FTC, or a new agency tasked specifically with privacy enforcement, 
needs the ability to write rules to clarify its authority. The purpose of agency 
rulemaking is to specify vague statutory requirements, offering clear notice 
as to what the law requires, an opportunity to participate in public 
governance, and a comprehensive resolution of questions facing large 
numbers of persons and businesses.349 However, the FTC is limited by the 
“procedurally burdensome” process of Magnuson-Moss rulemaking,350 
which requires the FTC to conduct industry-wide investigations, prepare 
reports, propose rules, engage in a series of public hearings, and consider 
other alternatives.351 The process is so difficult that the FTC has not engaged 
in it in decades.352 This lack of rulemaking authority ensures that, without 
more, privacy regulation from the FTC will remain vague and technology 
companies will remain the primary movers in determining what a given 
legal standard requires. As it is, the only way to discern what the FTC means 
by a specific term or phrase is to turn to its previous consent decrees, which 
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is what many practitioners do.353 But that common law analysis cannot 
achieve the level of clarity rulemaking can. If applied to Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, which only prohibits “unfair and deceptive” practices, and any 
other privacy statute, rulemaking could cut legal endogeneity off at the 
knees, limiting the ability of people on the ground to managerialize vague 
statutory terms. 
C. Changes at the FTC 
The FTC should not accept the mere presence of symbolic structures as 
evidence of compliance with the law.354 Deference to toothless internal 
structures is based on a neoliberal legal consciousness; regulators are 
primed to associate compliance structures with actual adherence to the 
substantive requirements of the law. As Edelman noted in the workplace 
discrimination context, the mere presence of these structures “creates an 
illusion of fairness” where none actually exists.355 The remedy for that is 
simple: Stop being fooled by the illusion. This Article has diagnosed the 
problem, so we can hope that regulators, with the political will and when 
given sufficient financial resources,356 will be more attuned to the ways in 
which corporations erect structures that comply with the law in name only. 
On a more granular level, FTC assessments must be more effective; they 
must be intensive, independent third-party audits. Securities regulation may 
provide a starting point. Among many other changes, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, as clarified by rules promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, requires publicly traded companies to have a 
completely independent audit committee.357 The committee serves as a 
check on nefarious financial reporting and is charged with the 
“appointment, compensation, and oversight” of the company’s independent 
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auditor.358 The committee must include at least one financial expert and 
have a mechanism for anonymously reporting questionable accounting.359 
Sarbanes-Oxley made internal auditing teams cornerstones of business 
models: long seen as simple cost centers, audit teams are now essential to 
corporate governance and legal compliance.360 Sarbanes-Oxley also 
requires executives to sign financial statements, ensuring greater 
involvement and establishing a sense of personal responsibility for 
honesty.361  
A similar approach could both invigorate FTC-mandated audits and 
empower a company’s internal privacy team, many of which are seen as 
cost centers, as well.362 As discussed earlier, many companies subject to 
FTC consent decrees fulfill their audit requirements with assessments or 
attestations, without any deep, independent investigation. Sarbanes-Oxley-
style rules governing both audit committees and independent audits 
themselves would both ensure greater adherence to the law and prevent the 
managerialization of privacy audits. Requiring executives to sign off on 
privacy audits and internal privacy programs, and subjecting them to civil 
and criminal penalties should they mislead regulators, could also have a 
sufficient motivating effect to take privacy seriously. The FTC’s 2019 
settlement with Facebook adopts this last suggestion.363 
That said, it is not clear that an internal auditing system will be sufficient. 
Auditing-based models like the one in Sarbanes-Oxley are part of the 
privatization of regulation criticized above.364 And, as Julie Cohen has 
argued, they “sit on the periphery of the regulatory state,” having the look 
and feel of administrative oversight, but with too unhealthy a dose of private 
control.365 
D. Empowering Individuals 
Even an invigorated, aggressive FTC cannot do this alone. At most, the 
FTC averages ten privacy-related settlements per year.366 The 
Commission’s portfolio extends beyond privacy issues, covering many 
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“unfair and deceptive” practices in commerce.367 And FTC settlements offer 
corporations an entry point for institutionalizing and validating their merely 
symbolic compliance structures. 
Therefore, any new privacy law must include a private right of action. 
Although judicial proceedings are not immune to the endogeneity cycle—
indeed, reference, relevance, and deference are judicial contributions to the 
problem—giving individuals the opportunity to realize their rights in court 
has worked in the past. Civil litigation made dangerous machines safer;368 
private lawsuits gave us seatbelts,369 stronger automobile frames,370 safer 
doors,371 side impact protection,372 and many other car safety features.373 
Little if any of that would have happened if car safety was the exclusive 
responsibility of a small, underfunded regulatory agency that has acceded 
to a self-governing privacy regime. 
Private rights of action can protect privacy laws against the cycle of legal 
endogeneity by forcing organizations to take privacy more seriously than 
they do now. As we have seen, some corporations frame privacy law 
compliance around minimizing the risk of litigation.374 Because they do so 
in a legal environment where federal standing requirements375 and narrowly 
drafted laws376 have made it difficult to bring claims except in a few 
circumstances, the risk of a lawsuit is low. Low risk means investing in 
privacy from the ground up brings little in return, thus contributing to 
crumbling privacy infrastructures. And although privacy professionals and 
privacy lawyers are rightly wary of European regulators empowered by the 
GDPR, European data protection regulators cannot effectively monitor the 
global landscape of data collection.377  
Admittedly, private rights of action are not panacean levers of reform. 
Opening the door to impact civil litigation could mean very little without 
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concomitant liberality from judges in recognizing privacy harms, especially 
where judges demand a laser precise causal chain between privacy breach 
and some concrete pecuniary injury.378 Despite some progress in this area, 
judicial reliance on concreteness and financial loss is sticky in part because 
it fits both judges’ perceptions of their own institutional competence and a 
narrative that industry has been pushing for years.379 After all, litigation can 
favorably tilt toward wealthy, entrenched interests that have the power, 
money, and time to litigate not just for individual wins—in which case, 
settlements may make rational sense—but for structural advantage in 
precedent, governing law, and legal consciousness.380 That said, a private 
right of action is one of several weapons needed to change the status quo. It 
can “catalyz[e] a societal shift toward a thicker notion of industrial 
responsibility,” as it did with mass environmental torts and products 
liability.381 And in a world where our regulatory agencies have taken a step 
back from the kind of robust, industry-wide rules necessary to keep 
individuals safe, the courts can nudge the kind of structural change we 
sorely need. 
E. Compliance Professionals 
Privacy lawyers and compliance professionals are a diverse group of 
committed leaders, many of whom chose their professions because they 
believe in consumer privacy, not because they wanted to undermine it in the 
name of corporate profits. Many of these professionals, however, are torn 
between their privacy advocacy and the need to influence policy with a seat 
at the table or the ear of the executive.382 Standing in the way of corporate 
profits by saying “no” too often or rejecting profitable products for privacy 
reasons can erode trust with executives, damage their ability to get things 
done, or get them fired and replaced by someone more pliant.383 Many 
privacy professionals I interviewed echoed these concerns. For example, a 
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former chief privacy officer based in Chicago found the problem of 
symbolic structures “intriguing” but wondered:  
What else are we supposed to do. We really serve two masters: the 
regulators and our bosses. If I go too far with the chief executive, he 
could just as easily ignore me and sideline my office from important 
decisions. Earning their trust is important, and you can’t do that if you 
don’t have the company’s interests in mind.384 
I am sensitive to these practical concerns, which make the social practice 
of privacy law far more complicated than writing laws in state capitols or in 
Congress. That said, the privacy professionals and lawyers I interviewed 
thought certain changes made sense. Several privacy leads thought “clearer 
guidance from the FTC or from Congress” with “specific statements on 
what is required” would be welcome because, as one current CPO noted, 
“then I can go to the executive team and say, ‘look, we have to do this.’ That 
makes it so much easier for me to do real privacy advocacy inside the 
company.”385 Others also said that more resources, moving privacy out of 
the compliance portfolio, and elevating the CPO to a board-level position 
would help get the message across. 
Scholars have argued that the best way to ensure privacy becomes part 
of the ethos of a company is to have distributed privacy responsibilities 
through different business units.386 That is an important first step, but it does 
not address the problem of merely symbolic privacy structures. Business 
unit leaders should not just have local responsibility for integrating privacy 
into their work; they should also be held responsible for substantive results. 
That is, it is one thing to task a business-line executive with developing 
specific privacy practices or completing a privacy impact assessment. As 
this Article has shown, executives can take that responsibility and supervise 
the creation of a house of cards of privacy structures. A more powerful 
approach would be to evaluate subordinates for their substantive privacy 
progress—namely, whether a new product collects the least amount of data 
necessary, limits data collection for a single purpose, includes designs that 
make it easy for users to exercise their rights, eliminates dark patterns, 
protects the unique privacy needs of marginalized populations, and so forth. 
Achieving some of these goals may have been the purpose of deploying a 
PIA in the first place, but shifting the metric of evaluation of a privacy 
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program from a structure to substance would stop legal endogeneity in its 
tracks. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy law is at risk. As this Article has attempted to show, it is 
undergoing a process of what Lauren Edelman called legal endogeneity, 
whereby systems that have the veneer of legality—paper trails, assessments 
and audits, internal and external policies, to name just a few—take the place 
of actual adherence to the law. And when these merely symbolic structures 
proliferate, they undermine the substantive power of the law and shift the 
discourse of power, all to the detriment of consumer privacy.  
It is important to note what this Article is not arguing. It does not argue 
that all compliance professionals are part of the problem. Nor does it argue 
that they alone are responsible for undermining the promise of privacy law. 
Rather, the impact of corporate compliance structures is both significant and 
underexplored. This Article has endeavored to fill a gap in the legal, 
sociological, and interdisciplinary privacy literatures by describing a 
narrative that has gone mostly unnoticed in the practice and study of privacy 
law.  
But more work needs to be done. Future research will explore the role of 
privacy technology vendors within an ecosystem of social forces 
influencing the implementation of privacy law on the ground. Another 
project will explore the engineerization of automated decision-making. And 
additional research is necessary on responses to the problem of legal 
endogeneity, including ongoing work on privacy education for engineers 
and licensing requirements for those designing software tools. More 
broadly, the growing impact of symbolic compliance reminds scholars that 
the social practice of law, the way real people tasked with implementing the 
law filter legal requirements for society, requires significantly more 
scholarly attention. Identifying the erosion of privacy law is a first step. 
Even harder work comes next. 
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